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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-46 
"Assured clear distance ahead" or "ra-
dius of lights" application of doctrine 
to accident involving pedestrian crossing 
street or highway, 31 A. L . R. 2d 1424. 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for 
automobiles, 29 A. L. R. 883. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 
99 A. L. R. 756. 
"Residence district," "business district," 
"school area,'' and the like, in statutes 
and ordinances regulating speed of motor 
vehicles, 50 A. L. R. 2d 343. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; 
definiteness and certainty, 12 A. L. R . 2d 
580. 
Validity of statute or ordinance forbid-
ding running of a utomobile so as to in-
flict damage or injury, 47 A. L. R. 255. 
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 A. 
L. R. 1273, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1337. 
When automobile is under control, 28 A. 
L. R. 952. 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
Section 41-6-46. Speed regulations - Maximum speeds - School buildings - Intersec-
tions, crossings, and curves-Emergency power of the governor. 
41-6-47. Prima facie limit. 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions-Powers of local authorities. 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges-Prima facie evidence. 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway-Barricade or obstruction 
therefor. 
41-6-52. Violation-Pleading. 
41-6-52.1. Resume speed road sign, 
41-6-46. Speed regulations - Maximum speeds - School buildings -
Intersections, crossings, a.nd curves - Emergency power of the governor.-
( I) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater 
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having re-
gard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event 
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with 
any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in 
compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due 
care. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful 
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that 
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) Twenty miles per hour. 
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school 
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or 
closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete 
stop before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods. 
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or residential district. 
(c) Sixty miles per hour in other locations during the daytime. 
(d) Fifty miles per hour in such other locations during the nighttime. 
Daytime means from half hour before sunrise to half hour after sunset. 
Nighttime means at any other hour. 
(3) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements 
of subdivision (1) of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, 
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41-6-46 MOTOR VEHICLES 
when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill 
crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when 
special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by 
reason of weather or highway conditions. 
( 4) Provided, that the governor by proclamation, in time of war or 
national emergency, may upon recommendation of the federal authorities, 
change the speed on the highways of the state, to conform to such recom-
mendations. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 36; C. 1943, 
57-7-113; L. 1951, ch. 72, § 1; 1957, ch. 76, 
§ 1; 1959, ch. 66, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Th e 1951 amendment added the provi-
sions of subsec. (4). 
The 1957 amendment changed the desig-
nation of subsections from letters to num-
bers and the designation of subdivisions 
in subsec. (2) from numbers to letters; 
deleted a provision restricting speed to 20 
miles per hour "upon meeting or overtak-
ing any" appropriately marked school bus; 
and inserted a provision requiring stopping 
for school buses loading and unloading 
children. 
The 1959 amendment deleted the pro-
vision inserted in 1957 relating to stop-
ping for school buses. For the present law 
relating to school bus signs and light 
signals and the duty to stop for buses, 
see 41-6-100.10. 
Cross-References. 
Municipal regulations, 10-8-30. 
Reckless driving, 41-6-45, 76-49-1. 
1. Construction and application. 
This section requires that driver shall 
not drive at speed greater than is reason-
able and prudent in view of existing con-
ditions and hazards on highway, that his 
speed shall be controlled so as to avoid 
colliding with other vehicles entering or 
upon highway in lawful manner, and that 
speecl shall be appropria tely reduced when 
special hazards exist with respect to other 
traffic or by reason of weather conditions. 
Horsley v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 186 P . 
2d 592. 
2. Constitutionality. 
A former speed law was held constitu-
tional as against contention that it vio-
latecl Const. Art. VI, § 23. State v. Brown, 
75 U. 37, 282 P. 785. 
3. Negligence. 
Ordinarily it is not negligence to op-
erate a motor vehicle within the speed 
limit prescribecl by statute or ordinance, 
although a jury may say in some instances, 
dependent upon the particular attendant 
f acts and circumstances, that the opera-
tion of an automobile within prescribed 
limit is nevertheless negligence. Loch-
heacl v. Jensen, 42 U. 99, 129 P. 347. 
Violation of speed regulations may con-
stitute negligence per se. Jensen v. Utah 
Light & Railway Co., 42 U. 415, 132 P. 8. 
Operating a motor vehicle at less than 
the lawful maximum speed may consti-
tute negligence under given circumstances. 
Fowkes v . J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 
46 U. 502, 151 P . 53. 
It has long been the rule in this state 
that it is n egligence as a matter of law 
to drive an a utomobile upon a travelecl 
public highway a t such rate of speed that 
said automobile cannot be stopped within 
distance a t which operator of said car is 
able to see objects upon highway in front 
of him. Dalley v . Midwestern Dairy Prod-
ucts Co., 80 U . 331, 15 P. 2d 309. 
When a driver upon a public highway 
with his light equipment cannot see more 
than 50 feet ahead of him, it is his duty 
to drive at such speed as will enable 
him to stop within that distance. Hansen 
v. Clyde, 89 U. 31, 56 P. 2d 1366, 104 A. 
L. R. 943. 
For general discussion as to speed and 
civil liability with respect thereto, see 
opinions by Wade, Wolfe and Pratt, JJ. , 
in Horsley v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 186 
P. 2d 592. 
Where fog was so great that visibility 
was limited to 20 or 25 feet and a safe 
speed under those conditions was about 
five miles per hour, the court cannot say 
as a matter of law that the plaintiff was 
not negligent in operating his car at the 
rate of 25 miles per hour. Shields v. 
Ramon, 12,2 U. 474, 251 P. 2d 671. 
What is a reasonable and prudent speed 
under the conditions and having regard 
to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing is a matter about which there is 
room for reasonable disagreement and 
such being the case, a jury question is 
presented. Lodder v. Western Pac. R. Co., 
123 U. 316, 259 P. 2d 589. 
4. Motor carriers and buses. 
Driver of vehicle carrying passengers 
for hire owes them duty to operate vehicle 
within such rate of speed as reasonably 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-46 
prudent person would operate under exist-
ing conditions, and, where road and 
weather conditions make driving hazard-
ous, reasonable prudence r equires propor-
tionate increase in care of driver to avoid 
injury to passengers. Horsley v. Robinson, 
112 U. 227, 186 P. 2d 592. 
Where bus, while traveling between 20 
and 50 miles per hour under very hazard-
ous conditions on outside lane of main 
l1ighway which was covered with ice and 
slush, collided with automobile approach-
ing from opposite direction which went out 
of control and skidded into path of bus, 
and distance between bus and automobile, 
when it first became discernible that latter 
was out of control, was between 30 and 
330 feet, evidence was sufficient to sustain 
verdict in favor of injured bus passenger 
for hire as against bus company, in that 
jury could conclude therefrom that bus 
driver was negligent in operating bus at 
excessive rate of speed under such circum-
stances, which was proximate cause of 
collision. Horsley v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 
186 P. 2d 592. 
5. Pleadings and proceedings. 
If the complaint is fatally defective in 
its allegations when viewed as an attempt 
to bring defendant within the provisions 
of this section, judgment for plaintiff will 
be reversed. 1"7oodward v. Spring Canyon 
Coal Co., 90 U. 578, 63 P. 2d 267. 
6. Questions of law and fact. 
Whether the speed at which the vehicle 
was going at the time was the proximate 
cause of the accident is a question of 
fact. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 U. 306, 
134 P. 1167, 8 N. C. C. A. 922. 
In action arising out of intersection 
collision, evidence sufficiently established 
prima facie case of negligence on part of 
defendant in failing to yield right of way 
and in traveling at excessive ra te of speed, 
and contributory negligence on part of 
plaintiff in failing to keep proper lookout 
and in traveling at excessive rate of speed 
was for jury. Martin v. Sheffield, 112 U. 
478, 189 P. 2d 127. 
In action against motorist for death of 
decedent, who was killed while hitching 
small tractor to reu.r of au automobile, it 
was a question of fact for the jury wheth-
er motorist was negligent in failing to 
reduce her speed below 50 miles per hour 
when she saw wrecker ahead of her on the 
highway. Taylor v. Johnson, 15 U. (2d) 
342, 393 P. 2d 382. 
mansla ughter. State v. Thatcher, 108 U. 
63, 157 P. 2d 258. 
8. Instructions. 
In action arising out of car-pedestrian 
accident in California, evidence did not 
justify instruction that defendant had 
duty to drive car in conformity with 
California statute providing that no per-
son shall drive vehicle at speed greater 
than is reasonable and prudent, where 
there was no evidence that defendant's 
speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour was 
excessive or unreasonable. (Deering's Cal. 
Vehicle Code § 510.) Hunter v. Michaelis, 
114 U. 242, 198 P. 2d 245. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles(g:::,331. 
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 641-650. 
Speed, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 734 et seq., 819, 
Automobiles and Highway Traffie §§ 180 et 
seq., 268. 
Application of "assured clear distance 
ahead" or "radius of lights" doctrine to 
accident involving pedestrian crossing 
street or highway, 31 A. L. R. 2d 1424. 
"Assured clear distance" statute or rule 
as applied at hill or curve, 133. A. L. R. 
967. 
Conflict between statutes and local reg-
ulations as to speed, 21 A. L. R. 1187, 
64 A. L. R. 994, 147 A. L. R. 529. 
Criminal or penal responsibility of pub-
lic officer or employee for violating speed 
regulations, 9 A. L. R. 367. 
Driving at illegal speed as reckless 
chiving within statute making reckless 
driving a criminal offense, 86 A. L. R. 
1281, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1337. 
Driving automobile at a speed which 
prevents stopping within length of vision 
as negl igence, 44 A. L. R. 1403, 58 A. L. R. 
1493, 87 A. L. R. 900, 97 A. L. R. 546. 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for 
automobiles, 29 A. L. R. 883. 
E xpert opinion evidence of speed not 
based upon view of vehicle, 156 A. L. R. 
382. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 
99 A. L. R. 756. 
Indefiniteness of automobile speed regu-
lations as affecting validity, 6 A. L. R. 
3d 1326. 
Indictment or information which charges 
offense as to speed in language of statute, 
115 A. L. R. 357. 
7. Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist charged with 
speeding under this section does not bar 
subsequent prosecution for involuntary 
Meaning of "residence district," "busi-
ness district," "school area," and the like, 
in statutes and ordinances regulating 
speed of motor vehicles, 50 A. L. R. 2d 
343. 
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Public officers or employees as bound by 
speed regulations, 19 A, L. R. 459, 23 
A. L. R. 418. 
Speeding prosecution based on observa-
tion from aircraft, 23 A. L. R. 3d 1446. 
Violation of speed law as affecting vio-
lator's right to recover for negligence, 12 
A. L. R. 463. 
Violation of speed regulations as affect-
ing rights to recover for injuries due to 
collision with streetcar, 28 A. L. R. 228, 
46 A. L. R. 1008. 
41-6-47. Prima facie limit.-Whenever the state road commission shall 
determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that 
any prima facie speed hereinbefore set forth is greater or less than is 
reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection 
or other place or upon any part of a state highway, said commission may 
determine and declare a reasonable and safe prima facie speed limit 
thereat which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice there-
of are erected at such intersection or other place or part of the highway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 37; C. 1943, 
57-7-114; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes, 
The 1955 amendment inserted "state" 
before "highway" the first time it appears, 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese:::>331. 
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 641-650, 
Speed, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 734 et seq., Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic § 180 et seq. 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions-Powers of local authorities.-(a) When-
ever local authorities other than cities of the first class within their re-
spective jurisdictions determine upon the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that the prima facie speed permitted under this act 
at any intersection is greater than is reasonable or safe under the condi-
tions found to exist at such intersection, such local authority, shall deter-
mine and declare a reasonable and safe prima facie speed limit thereat, 
which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are 
erected at such intersection or upon the approaches thereto. 
(b ). Local authorities other than cities of the first class in their re-
spective jurisdictions may in their discretion, authoriz.e by ordinance higher 
prima facie speeds than those stated in section 41-6-46 upon through high-
ways or upon highways or portions thereof where there are no intersec-
tions or between widely spaced intersections, provided signs are erected 
giving notice of the authorized speed, but local authorities other than cities 
of the first class shall not have authority to modify or alter the basic rule 
set forth in subdivision (a) [subsection (1)] of section 41-6-46 or in any 
event to authorize by ordinance a speed in excess of sixty miles per hour 
during the daytime and fifty miles per hour during the nighttime. 
( c) Whenever local authorities other than cities of the first class 
within their respective jurisdictions determine upon the basis of an engi-
neering and traffic investigation that the prima facie speed permitted under 
this act upon any highway outside a business or residence district is greater 
than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist upon such 
highway such local authority may determine and declare a reasonable and 
safe prima facie limit thereon but in no event less than thirty-five miles per 
hour which reduced prima facie limit shall be effective when appropriate 
signs giving notice thereof are erected upon such highway. Such highway to 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-49 
the prima facie lawful speed limit shall be designated. Wherever there is a 
drop of 10 MPH or more in the posted speed limit, it must be preceded by 
a sign giving advance notice of such a reduction. Signs shall be as speci-
fied in the current approved "Utah Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices." 
( d) Cities of the first class within their respective jurisdictions may de-
termine and declare reasonable and safe prima facie speed limits but such 
cities shall not have authority to modify or alter the basic rule set forth 
in subdivision (a) [subsection (1)] of section 41-6-46 or in any event to 
authorize by ordinance a speed in excess of sixty miles per hour. Such 
highway to be appropriately posted must be posted with reflector type signs 
whereon the prima facie lawful speed limit shall be designated. Wherever 
there is a drop of 10 MPH or more in the posted speed limit, it must be 
preceded by a sign giving advance notice of such a reduction. Signs shall 
be as specified in the current approved "Utah Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices." 
( e) The state road commission shall have exclusive authority to de-
termine and declare prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state high-
ways whether such highways be within or without the corporate limits of 
any city. A state highway, to be appropriately posted, must be posted with 
reflector type signs whereon the prima facie lawful speed limit shall be 
designated. Wherever there is a drop of 10 MPH or more in the posted 
speed limit, it must be preceded by a sign giving advance notice of such 
a reduction. Signs shall be as specified in the current approved "Utah 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices." 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §: 38; C. 1943, 
57-7-115; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1951 (1st 
S. S.), ch. 12, § 1; 1957, ch. 77, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted the pro-
visions of subsec. ( c) and made other 
minor changes in phraseology. 
The 1951 (1st S. S.) amendment in-
serted the phrase "other than cities of the 
first class" in subsecs. (a), (b) and (c); 
inserted the provisions of subsec. ( d); 
rewrote subsec. ( e) (formerly sub sec. ( d)) 
which read: "Alteration of prima facie 
limits on state highways or extensions 
thereof in a municipality by local au-
thorities shall not be effective until such 
alteration has been approved by the state 
road commission"; and made other minor 
changes in phraseology. 
The 1957 amendment added the last 
sentences in subsecs. ( c) and ( d) and 
rewrote subsec. (e) which, as amended in 
1951, read: "The state road commission 
shall have exclusive authority to determine 
and declare prima facie evidence of a 
lawful speed on state highways whether 
such highways be within or without the 
corporate limits of any city and none of 
the foregoing provisions of this section 
apply to state highways." 
The bracketed references to "subsection 
(l)" in subsecs. (b) and (d) were inserted 
by the compiler. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1!}51 (1st S. S.), ch. 
12 provided that act should take effect on 
approval. Approved June 1.8, 1951. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~l68(1). 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 290. 
Conflict between statutes and local regu-
lations as to automobiles, 21 A. L. R. 1186, 
64 A. L. R. 993, 147 A. L. R. 522. 
Constitutionality of legislative delega-
tion of powers to prescribe or vary regu-
lations concerning motor vehicles used on 
highways, 87 A. L. R. 546. 
Traffic regulations, failure of munici-
pality to adopt or enforce as ground of 
its liability for damage to property or 
person, 92 A. L. R. 1495, 161 A. L. R. 
1404. 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations.-(a) No person shall drive a 
motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and 
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reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for 
safe operation or because upon a grade or in compliance with law; pro-
vided that operating a motor vehicle on a limited-access highway at less 
than the lawful maximum speed in a left-lane side by side and at the 
same speed as a vehicle operated in the adjacent right-lane shall consti-
tute evidence of impeding or blocking normal movement of traffic, except 
when a reduced speed is necessary because the left-lane is the approach lane 
of an exit ramp or because of congested traffic, adverse weather, or in 
compliance with official traffic-control devices. 
(b) Whenever the state road commission or local authorities within 
their respective jurisdictions determine on the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently 
impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the commission or 
such local authority may determine and shall post a minimum speed limit 
below which no person shall drive a vehicle except when necessary for 
safe operation or in compliance with law. 
History: L . 1941, ch. 52, § 39; C. 1943, 
57-7-116; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1967, ch. 89, 
§ 1; 1969, ch. 108, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The ] 955 amendment substituted "or" 
for "and" in the former second paragraph 
and added subsec. (b). 
The 1967 amendment deleted a second 
paragraph from subsec. (a ) which author-
ized police officers to enforce the provision 
by directions to drivers and provided that 
willful disobedience of the provision or 
refusal to comply with direction of an 
officer constituted a misdemeanor. 
The 1969 amendment added the proviso 
to subsec. (a). 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles<§;:;:::>·324. 
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 588. 
Civil cases involving law against slow 
speed, 66 A. L. R. 2d 1194. 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges-Prima facie evidence.-(a) 
No person shall drive a vehicle over any bridge or other elevated structure 
constituting a part of a highway at a speed which is greater than the 
maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such bridge or 
structure, when such structure is signposted as provided in this section. 
(b) The state road commission upon request from any local authority 
shall, or upon its own initiative, may conduct an investigation of any 
bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part of a highway, and 
if it shall thereupon find that such structure cannot with safety to itself 
withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise permissible under this 
act, the commission shall determine and declare the maximum speed of 
vehicles which such structure can withstand, and shall cause or permit 
suitable signs stating such maximum speed to be erected and maintained 
at a distance of 100 feet before each end of such structure. 
(c) Upon the trial of any person charged with a violation of this 
section, proof of said determination of the maximum speed by said com-
mission and the existence of said signs shall constitute conclusive evi-
dence of the maximum speed which can be maintained with safety to such 
bridge or structure. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-52.1 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway-Barricade or obstruc-
tion therefor.-(a) No person shall engage in any motor vehicle speed 
contest or exhibition of speed on a highway and no person shall aid or abet 
in any such motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition on any highway. 
(b) No person shall, for the purpose of facilitating or aiding or as 
an incident to any motor vehicle speed contest upon a highway, in any 
manner obstruct or place any barricade or obstruction or assist or partici-
pate in placing any such barricade or obstruction upon any highway. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-118.10, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese;;o6. 
Compiler's Notes. 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Former section 57-7-118, Code 1943 was 
repealed by Laws 1949, ch. 65, § 2. For 
present law relative to speed of emergency 
vehicles, see section 41-6-14. 
Drag racing: validity, construction, and 
application of criminal statutes, specifical-
ly chrected against racing of automobiles 
on public streets or highways ( drag rac-
ing), 24 A. L. R. 3d 1286. 
41-6-52. Violation-Pleading.-(a) In every charge of violation of any 
speed regulation in this act the complaint, also the summons or notice to 
appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have 
driven, also the prima facie speed applicable within the district or at the 
location. 
(b) The provisions of this act declaring prima facie speed limitations 
shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from 
the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the 
proximate cause of an accident . 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 42; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-119. Automobiles~351. 
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 588. 
41-6-52.1. Resume speed road sign.-Where road signs, for various 
reasons, reducing speed are placed on entering a city or town, a stretch of 
narrow road, or any given hazard on the highway, a Resume Speed Road 
Sign should be placed at a point beyond the restricted area where it would 
be safe for any vehicle to resume the maximum speed allowed in any given 
area. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 77, § 2. 
ARTICLE 7 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, 










Duty to drive on right side of highway-Exceptions. 
Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. 
Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction. 
Passing upon right-When permissible. 
Limitation of privilege. 
Driving on left side of road. 
Signs indicating passing zones. 
One-way traffic-Signs. 
Roadway laned for traffic-Rules in driving thereon-Designating 




41-6-53 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle-Proximity and distance-Space between 
vehicles in motor caravan-Exception as to funeral procession. 
41-6-63. Designation of distinctive roadway marking or markings-Where 
placed-Rule for drivers-Description of markings-Local au-
thorities may place markings. 
41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways by dividing section 
-Unlawful actions of drivers-Dividing section defined and de-
scribed. 
41-6-64. Limited-access roadway-Driving upon-Turning. 
41-6-65. Prohibiting use of limited-access highways by pedestrians, nonmo-
torized traffic and motor-driven cycles. 
41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway-Exceptions.-(a) 
Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the 
right half of the roadway, except as follows: 
(1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction under the rules governing such movement; 
(2) When the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under 
construction or repair; 
(3) Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under 
the rules applicable thereon; or 
( 4) Upon a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic. 
(b) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal 
speed of traffic at the time and place under the conditions then existing 
shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as 
close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except 
when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direc-
tion or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private 
road or driveway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 43; C. 1943, 
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (b). 
1. Construction and application. 
Where this section refers to "half the 
roadways," the reasonable interpretation 
of the meaning of this term is that it 
means half of the roadway as it exists at 
the time it is being traveled and not half 
the roadway as it may have been laid out 
originally. To this effect see Dixon v. 
Alabam Freight Co., 57 Ariz. 173, 112 P. 
2d 584, in which the Arizona court con-
strued sections similar to ours as quoted 
above. Patton v. Kirkman, 109 U. 487, 
167 P. 2d 282. 
2. Bicycle and truck. 
Driver of autotruck who was on right 
side of street and was not on, near to, or 
approaching crossing where both vehicles 
and pedestrians might pass either or both 
ways, had right to relax his vigilance and 
was not required to do more than to main-
tain such lookout as would prevent his 
colliding or coming in contact with any-
one on his side of street. Richards v. 
Palace Laundry Co., 55 U. 409, 186 P. 439. 
3. Negligence. 
The strongest kind of presumption of 
negligence prevails against party driving 
on wrong side of road. Station v. "\Vestern 
Macaroni Mfg. Co., 52 U. 426, 174 P. 821. 
Where one who is operating his vehicle 
on right-hand side of street makes survey 
of condition of street ahead of him, and 
in doing so he observes no one coming on 
his side of street, but sees one or more 
coming towards him on opposite side of 
street, he has right to assume that such 
person will continue onward on opposite 
side of street, and not encroach upon his 
side. Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 
U. 409, 186 P. 439. 
4. Effect of passing from right to center, 
While in case street or highway is not 
used by others one may drive on any part 
thereof, yet, when motorist or bicyclist 
passes from right to left of center of 
street, he loses some of his rights, and may 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-54 
those who are on proper side of street to 
same extent as though he also were on 
proper side, Richards v. Palace Laundry 
Co., 55 U. 409, 186 P. 439. 
5. Presumption. 
In action by bicyclist for mJuries sus-
tained . in collision with autotruck when 
plaintiff was thrown in front of defend-
ant's oncoming vehicle, held driver of au-
totruck had legal right to presume that 
plaintiff would not encroach upon his side 
of street, and to hold defendant liable, 
plaintiff was required to prove more than 
mere fact that autotruck could have been 
stopped or turned aside in distance of 10 
or 15 feet. Richards v. Palace Laundry 
Co., 55 U. 409, 186 P. 439. 
6. Instruction. 
In action by bicyclist for personal in-
juries sustained as result of collision with 
automobile at intersection, instruction that 
motorist had right to presume that every 
other person would obey law by traveling 
on right-hand side of road, and that no 
duty rested upon motorist to stop or 
change course of automobile until he had 
reason to believe that plaintiff was travel-
ing on wrong side of street, was properly 
refused where it was disputed question as 
to whether bicyclist was on wrong side of 
roadway. Cheney v. Buck, 56 U. 29, 189 
P. 81. 
Where collision takes place upon street 
having four traffic lanes, it is proper to 
instruct as to duty of defendant to use 
right traffic lane, and as to duty of the 
respective parties to use lane 4 rather than 
lane 3, where the evidence warrants such 
instruction. Thomas v. Sadleir, 108 U. 
552, 162 P. 2d 112, setting out instruction, 
embodying this section of the Motor Ve-
hicle Law and the exceptions, and held to 
be nonprejudicial and not objectionable 
as stating the last clear chance doctrine. 
7. Questions of law and fact. 
In action by bicyclist for personal in-
juries sustained as result of collision with 
automobile at intersection, whether bicy-
clist was on right side of traveled road 
held for jury. Cheney v. Buck, 56 U. 29, 
189 P. 81. 
In personal-injury action arising out of 
automobile-truck collision on highway, ul-
timate question of fact as to which of 
two drivers failed to keep his vehicle 
upon proper side of road was for jury . 
Moser v. Zion's Co-Op. Mercantile Insti-
tution, 114 U. 58, 197 P. 2d 136. 
8. Violation as prima facie evidence of 
negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evi-
dence of negligence subject only to justi-
fication or excuse. Platis v. United States, 
288 F. Supp. 254. 
9, Backing. 
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to 
right have no application to backing. Nais-
bitt v. Eggett, 5 U. (2d) 5, 295 P. 2d 832. 
Collateral References. 
A utomo biles<S=l53. 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268. 
Portion of highway to be used; fol-
lowing, approaching, and passing other 
vehicles, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 768 et seq., Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic § 219 et seq. 
Duties imposed by statute where motor 
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle 
proceeding in same direction, cuts back to 
the right, 48 A. L. R. 2d 233. 
Right or duty to turn in violation of 
law of road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 
24 A. L. R. 1304, 63 A. L. R. 277, 113 
A. L. R. 1328. 
Validity of regulations as to part of 
street to be used by moving vehicles, 29 
A. L. R. 1348. 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions.-Drivers of 
vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the 
right and upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic 
in each direction, each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of 
the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 44; C. 1943, L12 P. 2d 584, construing similar section of 
57-7-121. the statutes of that state. 
1. Construction and application, 
Where this section refers to half the 
roadway, it means half of the roadway 
as it exists at the time it is being traveled, 
and not half the roadway as it may have 
been laid - out originally. Patton v. Kirk-
man, 109 U. 487, 167 P. 2d 282, following 
Dixon v. Alabam Freight Co., 57 Ariz. 173, 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese:,,170 (2). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 306. 
Vehicles proceeding in opposite direc-
tions, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 775, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic § 225; 8 Am. Jur. 2d 315 
et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic 
§ 758 et seq. 
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41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction. 
-The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles 
proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations, exceptions, 
and special rules hereinafter stated: 
(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in 
the same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall 
not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of 
the overtaken vehicle. 
(b) Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, 
the driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor 
of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the 
speed of his v ehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 45; C. 1943, had no duty to sound horn upon attempting 
57-7-122. to pass another vehicle was objectionable 
1. Construction and application. 
The rule, whether statutory or decisional, 
which requires driver of vehicle overtak-
ing another proceeding in same direction 
to pass to the left at a safe distance, 
imposes a high degree of care commensur-
ate with the circumstances involved. The 
driver attempts to pass at his peril, and 
the situation facing him must be such as 
to reasonably assm·e an ordinarily prudent 
driver that the passing can be accom-
plished with safety to all occupants of the 
road. Maragakis v. United States, 172 
F. 2d 393. 
In action for wrongful death of 11-year-
old boy, two instructions, one based on 
subsection (b) of this section, the other, 
conforming with subsection (a) of 41-6-
146, to the effect that driver of vehicle 
intending to pass another vehicle does not, 
under all circumstances, owe duty of 
sounding horn, but sounding of horn is 
left to judgment of operator in exercise of 
due care, were not inconsistent, where 
instructions dealt with different fact sit-
uations. Manning v. Powers, 117 U. 310, 
215 P. 2d 396. 
2. Questions of Jaw and fact. 
Whether defendant violated this section 
by passing on wrong side of road and 
failing to sound his horn is question of 
fact ordinarily. Fowkes v. J. I. Case 
Threshing Mach. Co., 46 U. 502, 151 P. 53. 
3. Evidence. 
In action under F ederal Tort Claims 
Act, evidence disclosed that driver of gov-
ermnent vehicle failed to exercise due care 
in placing himself in position of p eril by 
attempting to pass to the left of plain-
tiffs' vehicle. Maragakis v. United States, 
172 F. 2d 393. 
4. Duty to sound horn. 
Instruction that driver of automobile 
on basis tha t while there is no general 
duty to sound his horn, driver does have 
duty to give audible warning of approach 
a nd intention to pass where it would 
appear from all circumstances that such 
warning is reasonably necessary to ensure 
safe operation. Barton v. Jensen, 19 U. 
(2d) 196, 429 P. 2d 44. 
5. Violation as prima facie evidence of 
negligence. 
Violation of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evi-
dence of negligenc e subject only to justifi-
cation or excuse. Platis v. United States, 
288 F. Supp. 254. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles@=172 (2). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326. 
Duties imposed by statute where motor 
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle 
proceeding in same direction, cuts back to 
the right, 48 A. L. R. 2d 233. 
Duty and liability of overtaken driver 
with respect to a djusting speed to that 
of passing vehicle, 91 A. L. R. 2d 1260. 
Giving audible signal where driver's 
v iew ahead is obstructed at curve or hill, 
duty and liability with respect to, 16 
A. L. R. 3d 897. 
Reciprocal duties of driver of automo-
b iles or other vehicles proceeding in same 
direction, 24 A. L. R. 507, 47 A. L. R. 
703, 62 A. L . R. 970, 104 A. L. R. 485. 
Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities 
where driver of motor vehicle a ttempts to 
pass on right of other motor vehicle pro-
ceeding in same direction, 38 A. L. R. 2d 
114. 
Rights and liabilities as between drivers 
of motor vehicles proceeding in same di, 
recti.on, where one or both attempt to pass 
on left of another vehicle so proceeding, 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATION$ 41-6-57 
41-6-56. Passing upon right-When pennissible.-(a) The driver of a 
vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only 
under the following conditions: 
1. When the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left 
turn; 
2. Upon a street or highway with unobstructed pavement not occupied 
by parked vehicles of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving 
vehicles in each direction; 
3. Upon a one-way street, or upon any roadway on which traffic is 
restricted to one direction of movement, where the roadway is free from 
obstructions and of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving 
vehicles. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and, allowing sufficient 
clearance, pass another vehicle upon the right only under conditions 
permitting such movement in safety. In no event shall such movement be 
made by driving off the pavement or main-traveled portion of the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 46; C, 1943, Failure of motorist to give signal for 
57-7-123; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. left turn between intersections, liability 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added subds. (a) 
2 and (a) 3 and rewrote subsec. (b) which 
formerly read: "(b) The driver of a ve-
hicle may overtake and, allowing sufficient 
clearance, pass another vehicle proceeding 
in the same direction either upon the left 
or upon the right on a roadway with un-
obstructed pavement of sufficient width for 
four or more lines of moving traffic when 
such movement ean be made in safety." 
Collateral References. 
Automo biles~l 72 (2). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326. 
Collision between automobile making U-
turn and another vehicle, liability arising 
from, 6 A. L. R. 2d 1244. 
Cutting corners as negligence, 115 A . 
L. R. 1178. 
for accident arising from, 39 A. L. R. 2d 
103. 
Operation of statutory regulation where 
driver of motor vehicle attempts to pass 
on right of other vehicle proceeding in 
same direction, 38 A. L. R. 2d 123. 
Passing vehicle, duty and liability of 
overtaken driver with respect to adjusting 
speed to that of, 91 A. L. R. 2d 1260. 
Right of way at street or highway in-
tersections, 21 A. L. R. 974, 37 A. L . R. 
493, 47 A. L. R. 595, 89 A. L. R. 838, 
136 A. L. R. 1497. 
Violation of regulation requiring one 
intending to turn left at intersection to 
approach in traffic lane nea rest to center 
of street or highway, 87 A. L. R. 1165, 
Violation of statute by motorist's failure 
to give signal for left turn at intersection 
with respect to motor vehicle proceeding 
in same direction, 39 A. L. R. 2d 32. 
41-6-57. Limitation of privilege.-N o vehicle shall be driven to the left 
side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is clearly 
visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to per-
mit such overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering 
with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direc-
tion of any vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must 
return to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within 100 feet 
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction . 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 47; C. 1943, using their left side of the highway; and 
57-7-124. when they do so in conformity with law 
1. Application. 
Vehicles are not always prohibited from 
and in due care, it is not negligence. Thus 
where defendant turned his car to the 
left in order to see around a truck and 
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see if it were clear to pass, and was then 
struck by plaintiff's car coming in the 
opposite direction, it was not negligence 
on the defendant's part. Weenig Bros. v. 
Manning, 1 U. (2d) 101, 262 P. 2d 491. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles<s=l 72 (2). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326. 
Construction, applicability, and effect of 
ti-affic regulation prohibiting vehicles from 
passing one another at street or highway 
intersection, 53 A. L. R. 2d 850. 
Duty in operating automobile at curve 
or on hill, 57 A. L. R. 589. 
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automo-
biles or other vehicles proceeding in the 
same direction, 104 A. L. R. 485. 
Reciprocal rights, duties, and liabilities 
where driver of motor vehicle attempts to 
pass on right of other motor vehicle pro-
ceeding in same direction, 38 A. L. R. 2d 
114. 
Rights and liabilities as between drivers 
of motor vehicles proceeding in same di-
rection, where one or both attempt to pass 
on left of another vehicle so proceeding, 
27 A. L. R. 2d 317. 
41-6-58. Driving on left side of road.-(a) No vehicle shall at any 
time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following condi-
tions: 
(1) .. When approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve in the 
highway where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance as to 
create a hazard in the event another vehicle might approach from the 
opposite direction. 
(2) When approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersec-
tion or railroad grade crossing. 
(3) When the view is obstructed upon approaching within 100 feet 
of any bridge, viaduct, or -wnnel. 
(b) The foregoing limitations shall not apply upon a one-way road-
way. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 48; C. 1943, 
57-7-125. 
1. Driving to left side of road within 100 
feet of intersection. 
It was held that lower court properly 
directed a verdict of no cause of action 
where plaintiff did not make turn at in-
tersection, but south of intersection some 
50 feet. Hart v. Kerr, 110 U. 479, 175 P. 
2d 4 75. 
2. Passing within 100 feet of intersection. 
An instruction that a driver had no right 
in attempting to pass at an intersection 
was error where, at the point where the 
collision occurred there were no markers 
prohibiting passing, there was nothing to 
indicate a turn-off road from the highway, 
and no markers showing that a road left 
the highway in the area. Douglas v. Gigan-
det, 8 U. (2d) 245, 332 P. 2d 932. 
3. Violation as prima facie evidence of 
negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evi-
dence of negligence subject only to justifi-
cation or excuse. Platis v. United States, 
288 F. Supp. 254. 
4. "Intersection." 
Jury was properly instructed that site of 
collision was "intersection" under statute 
in light of evidence that crossing rnad 
intersected main highway from both east 
and west and crossed it at right angles, 
that main highway was widened for about 
1/10 of a mile in both directions to pro• 
vide extra lane for acceleration and de-
celeration in entering or leaving highway 
and that there were stop signs at both east 
and west side to warn oncoming traffic; 
result was not changed by fact that cross-
ing road was only infrequently traveled 
dirt road and not readily observable to 
main highway traveler. Hathaway v. Marx, 
21 U. (2d) 33, 439 P. 2d 850. 
Collateral References. 
Automo biles<s=l53. 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268. 
Giving audible signal where driver's 
view ahead is obstructed at curve or hill, 
duty and liability with respect to, 16 
A. L. R. 2d 897. 
Responsibility for collision at night of 
automobiles, one of which, with lights on, 
is standing or moving on wrong side of 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-61 
Right or duty to turn in violation of 
law of road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 
24 A. L. R. 1304, 63 A. L. R. 277, 113 
A. L. R. 1328. 
Statutes regulating or forbidding pass• 
ing on hill by vehicle, construction and 
a pplication of, 60 A. L. R. 2d 211. 
Street or highway intersection within 
traffic rules, definition, 7 A. L . R. 3cl 1204 . 
41-6-59. Signs indicating passing zones.-The state road commission is 
authorized to determine those portions of any highway where overtaking 
and passing or driving to the left of the roadway would be especially 
hazardous and may by appropriate signs or marks on the roadway indicat e 
the beginning and end of such zones and when such signs or markings are 
in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person every driver 
of a vehicle shall obey the directions thereof. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 49; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-126. Automobiles~10. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
41-6-60. One.way traffic-Signs.-(a) The state road commission and 
local authorities may designate any highway, roadway, part of a roadway 
or specific lanes under their respective jurisdictions upon which vehicular 
traffic shall proceed in one direction at all or such times as shall be indi-
cated by official traffic-control devices. 
(b) Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall 
be driven only in the direction indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(c) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven 
only to the right of such island. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 50; C. 1943, 
57-7-127; L. 1969, ch. 109, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Prior to the 1969 amendment subsec. 
(a.) read: "The state roa d commission may 
designate any highway or any separate 
roadway under its jurisdiction for one-way 
traffic ancl shall erect appropriate signs 
giving notice thereof" and subsec. (b) 
read: "Upon a roadway designated and 
signposted for one-way traffic a vehicle 




60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
41-6-61. Roadway laned for traffic-Rules in driving thereon-Desig. 
nating lanes or certain traffic.-Whenever any roadway has been divided 
into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in 
addition to all others consistent herewith .shall apply: 
(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has 
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. 
(b) Upon a roadway which is divided into three lanes a vehicle shall 
not be driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing 
another vehicle where the roadway is clearly visible and such center lane 
is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation for a left 
turn or where such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic 
moving in the direction the vehicle is proceeding and is signposted to give 
notice of such allocation. 
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( c) Official signs may be erected directing slow-moving traffic to use 
a designated lane or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving in the same 
direction and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such 
sign. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 51; C. 1943, 
57-7-128; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes, 
The 1949 amendment substituted "two 
or more" for "three or more" in the first 
paragraph. 
1. Violation as prima facie evidence of 
negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evi-
dence of negligence subject only to justifi-
cation or excuse. Platis v. United States, 
288 F. Supp. 254. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles€=:l-153. 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 274. 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle-Proximity and distance-Space 
between vehicles in motor caravan-Exception as to funeral procession.-
( a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more 
closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed 
of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. 
(b) The driver of any truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle 
when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district 
shall not follow within 150 feet of another truck or motor vehicle drawing 
another vehicle. The provisions of this subdivision shall not be construed 
to prevent overtaking and passing nor shall the same apply upon any 
lane especially designated for use by trucks. 
( c) Motor vehicles being driven upon any roadway outside of a busi-
ness or residence district in a caravan or motorcade whether or not towing 
other vehicles shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between each 
such vehicle or combinatiun of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle 
to enter and occupy such space without danger. This provision shall not 
apply to funeral processions. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 52; C. 1943, 
57-7-129; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "or motor 
vehicle" after "any truck" in subsec. (b) 
and added subsec. (c). 
1. Violation as prima facie evidence of 
negligence, 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are r egarded as prima facie evi-
dence of negligence subject only to justi-
fication or excuse. Platis v. United States, 
288 F. Supp. 254. 
2. Violation as question of fact. 
Violation of statute providing that 
driver shall not follow another vehicle 
more closely than is reasonable and pru-
dent is question of fact to be determined 
by trier of facts with result that appellate 
court could not say that as matter of 
law that lower court should have directed 
verdict in favor of plaintiff because de-
fendant had violated statute. Fairbourn v. 
Lloyd, 21 U. (2d) 62, 440 P. 2d 257. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~172(2). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 326. 
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automo-
biles or other vehicles proceeding in the 
same direction, 104 A. L. R. 485. 
41-6-63. Designation of distinctive roadway marking or markings-
Where placed-Rule for drivers-Description of markings-Local author-
ities may place markings.-(!) The state road commission shall, by regu-
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-63.10 
lation, designate a distinctive roadway [marking] or markings which 
shall indicate that no vehicle shall drive along the highway to the left 
thereof, and the state road commission is authorized to place such mark-
ing or markings on any portion of a state highway where the volume of 
traffic or the vertical or horizontal curvature of the roadway renders it 
hazardous to drive along the highway on the left of such marking or 
markings. When such marking or markings are in place, the driver of a 
vehicle shall not drive along the highway to the left thereof. 
The following markings, until so changed by regulation of the state 
road commission, shall be distinctive roadway markings: 
(a) A double longitudinal line, painted yellow, each line four inches 
wide, and spaced four inches apart. 
(b) A single solid yellow, longitudinal line, four inches wide, placed 
four inches to the right of a centerline marking. 
(2) Whenever the state road commission has designated a distinctive 
roadway marking or markings which shall indicate no driving along a 
highway to the left thereof, local authorities may place such markings upon 
streets or highways under their jurisdiction under the same conditions and 
with like effect as such marking or markings placed by the state road 
commission. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-129.10, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 3; 
1959, ch. 67, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section, as enacted in 1949 read: 
"Whenever any highway has been divided 
into two roadways by leaving an inter-
vening space or by a physical barrier or 
clearly indicated dividing section so con-
structed as to impede vehicular traffic, 
every vehicle shall be driven only upon 
the right-hand roadway and no vehicle 
shall be driven over, across, or within any 
such dividing space, barrier or section, 
except through an opening in such physical 
barrier or dividing section or space or at 
a crossover or intersection established by 
public authority." 
The 1957 amendment deleted "so con-
structed as to impede vehicular traffic" 
before "every vehicle." 
The 1959 amendment rewrote this sec• 
tion. 
The bracketed word "marking" in sub-
sec. (1) was inserted by the compiler. 
1. Violation as prima facie evidence of 
negligence. 
Violations of standards of safety set by 
statute are regarded as prima facie evi-
dence of negligence subject only to justi-
fication or excuse. Platis v. United States, 
288 F. Supp. 254. 
41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways by dividing 
section-Unlawful actions of drivers-Dividing section defined and de-
scribed.-Whenever a highway has been divided into two separate road-
ways by a dividing section, it shall be unlawful to drive any vehicle upon 
any such highway except to the right of such dividing section, or to drive 
any vehicle over, upon, or across any such dividing section or to make any 
left turn or semicircular or U-turn on any such divided highway, except 
through a plainly marked opening in such dividing section designed and 
designated for such left turn, semicircular or U-turn, unless a sign or signs 
authorized and displayed by the state road commission or other govern-
mental agency shall otherwise indicate. 
A dividing section shall divide a highway into two separate roadways 
and shall consist of: 




(2) .A physical barrier, curbs, or other clearly indicated dividing area 
so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic across the same; or, 
.A dividing area of over two feet in width defined by either: 
.A standard double line marking on each side of the dividing sec-
tion, each double line marking consisting of two four-inch wide 
(3) 
(a) 
lines four inches apart, or 
( b) Other marking, on each side of the dividing section of a type 
designated by the state road commission to indicate no driving 
along a highway to the left thereof. 
History; C. 1953, 41-6-63.10, enacted by 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. L. 1959, ch. 67, § 2. 
Collateral References. 
A utomobi1ese=o6. 
Automobile accidents on street or high-
way divided by parkway or other neutral 
strip, 165 A. L. R. 1418. 
41-6-64. Limited-access roadway-Driving upon-Turning,-No person 
shall (1) drive a vehicle over, upon, or across any curb, central dividing 
section or other separation or dividing line on limited-access highways; 
(2) make a left turn or a semicircular or U-turn except through an opening 
provided for that purpose in the dividing curb section, separation or line ; 
(3) drive any vehicle except in the proper lane provided for that purpose 
and in the proper direction and to the right of the central dividing curb, 
separation section, or line; ( 4) drive any vehicle into or from the limited-
access highway from a local service road except through an opening pro-
vided for that purpose in the dividing curb, or dividing section or 
dividing line whic.h separate such service road from the limited-access highway proper. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-64, re-enacted by 
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Section 41-6-64, Code 1953, (C. 1943, 
57-7-129.11, enacted by L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1), 
r elating to driving onto or from limited-
access roadways, was repealed by Laws 
1955, ch. 71, § 1. New section 41-6-64 was 
re-enacted by § 1 of the act. The prelimi-
nary clause of section 1 read: "Section 1. 
Secs. 41-6-6, 41-6-7, 41-6-8, 41-6-9, 41-6-34, 
41-6-36, 41-6-47, 41-6-49, 41-6-70, 41-6-76, 
41-6-77, 41-6-82, 41-6-90, 41-6-114, 41-6-117, 
41-6-120, 41-6-121, 41-6-123, 41-6-124, 41-6-
129, 41 -6-131, 41-6-133, 41-6-141, 41-6-142, 
41-6-149, 41-6-159, and 27-1 -28, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, a re amended; secs. 41-6-
14, 41-6-64, 41-6-130, 41-6-132, 41-6-134, 41-
6-135, 41-6-140, and 41-6-144, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, are repealed and re-
enacted; and new sections 41-6-43.10, 41-
6-72.10, 41-6-121.10, 41-6-140.10, 41-6-140.20, 
41-6-154.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are 
enacted to read: * * *." 
Cross-Reference. 
Limited-access fa cilities generally, 27-12-
111 et seq. 
41-6-65. Prohibiting use of limited-access highways by pedestrians, non-
motorized traffic and motor-driven cycles.-The state road commission may 
by resolution or order enter ed in its minutes, and local authorities may 
by ordinance with r espect to any limited-access roadway under their 
respective jurisdictions, prohibit the use of any such roadway by pedes-
trians, bicycles, or other nonmotorized traffic, or by any person operating a motor-driven cycle. 
The state road commission or the local authority adopting any such 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-66 
access roadway on which such regulations are applicable and when so 
erected no person shall disobey the restrictions stated on such signs. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-129.12, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
ARTICLE 8 
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING OR TURNING 
Section 41-6-66. Turning at intersection-Manner of executing right or left turn-
Signs or maTkers by local authoTities and obedience thereto. 
41-6-67. TuTning around prohibited on cmve or neaT crest of grade. 
41-6-68. Starting vehicles. 
41-6-69. Signals on turning, stopping or suddenly decreasing speed-When 
turning permissible. 
41-6 -70. Signals-Method of giving-Signal lamps. 
41-6-71. Signals-Manner of giving. 
41-6-66. Turning at intersection-Manner of executing right or left 
turn-Signs or markers by local authorities and obedience thereto.-The 
driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as 
follows: 
(a) Both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be 
made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. 
(b) At any intersection where traffic is permitted to move in both di-
rections on each roadway entering the intersection, an approach for a left 
turn shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest 
the center line thereof and by passing to the right of such center line 
where it enters the intersection and after entering the intersection the 
left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the 
center line of the roadway being entered. ·whenever practicable the left 
turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the 
center of the intersection. 
(c) At any intersection where traffic is restricted to one direction on 
one or more of the roadways, the driver of a vehicle intending to turn 
left at any such intersection shall approach the intersection in the ex-
treme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction 
of travel of such vehicle and after entering the intersection the left 
turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection, as nearly as practicable, 
in the left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction 
upon the roadway being entered. 
( d) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause 
markers, buttons or signs to be placed within or adjacent to intersections 
and thereby require and direct that a different course from that specified 
in this section be traveled by vehicles turning at an intersection, and when 
markers, buttons or signs are so placed no driver of a vehicle shall turn 
a vehicle at an intersection other than as directed and required by such 
marker, buttons or sign. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 53; C. 1943, 
57-7-130; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment rewrote the pro-
visions of sub secs. (b) and ( c) which 
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60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 367. 
Turning, 7 Am . .Tur. 2d 766-768, Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 216-218. 
Drivers of automobiles or other vehicles 
proceeding in same direction, reciprocal 
duties of, with respect to turning at inter-
sections, 24 A. L. R . 513, 47 A. L. R. 712, 
62 A. L. R. 980, 104 A. L . R. 531. 
Failure of motorist to give signal for 
left turn at intersection, as against on-
coming or intercepting motor vehicle, lia-
bility for accident arising from, 39 A. 
L. R. 2d 65. 
Failure of motorist to give signal for 
left turn between intersections, liability 
for accident arising from, 39 A. L. R. 2d 
103. 
Violation of statute by motorist's failure 
to give signal for left turn at intersection 
with respect to motor vehicle proceeding 
in same dfrection, 39 A. L. R. 2d 32. 
41-6-67. Turning around prohibited on curve or near crest of grade.-
No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction upon 
any curve, or upon the approach to, or near the crest of a grade, where 
such vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of any other vehicle approaching 
from either direction within 500 feet. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 54; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-131. Automobilese::>171 (12). 
1. Care required of plaintiff. 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 367. 
The general rules as to degree of care 
required of a person acting in an emer-
gency, created by wrongful act or negli-
gence of defendant, apply to this section. 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 U. 139, 122 P. 2d 
191, reversed on rehearing 104 U. 151, 140 
P. 2d 772. 
Liability arising from collision between 
automobile making U-turn and another 
vehicle, 6 A. L. R. 2d 1244. 
41-6-68. Starting vehicles.-No person shall start a vehicle which is 
stopped, standing, or parked unless and until such movement can be made 
with reasonable safety . 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 55; C. 1943, 
57-7-132. 
1. Sufficiency of evidence. 
In action for damages arising out of 
collision between motorcycle and truck, 
evidence was sufficient to support jury's 
finding that defendant, in violation of this 
section, moved his truck onto highway, 
from point where truck was parked on 
shoulder of highway, before such move-
ment could be made with reasonable 
safety. Spackman v. Carson, 117 U. 390, 
216 P . 2d 640. 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese::>173 (8). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 334. 
41-6-69. Signals on turning, stopping or suddenly decreasing speed-
When turning permissible.-(a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an 
intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as 
required in section 41-6-66, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or 
driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right 
or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with 
reasonable safety. No person shall turn any vehicle without g1vmg an 
appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any 
other traffic may be affected by such movement. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continu-
ously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before 
turning. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-70 
( c) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle 
without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein 
to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is op-
portunity to give such signal. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 56; C. 1943, 
57-7-133; L, 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment rewrote subsec. 
(a) which included a requirement for 
"giving a clearly audible signal by sound· 
ing the horn if any pedestrian may be 
affected by" turning "from a direct course 
upon a highway." 
1. Determination of matter of "reasonable 
safety." 
Facts may be so clear and indisputable 
that it may be said as a matter of law 
that turn could not be made "with reason-
able safety," ancl that defendant's act in 
turning was, as a matter of law, the sole 
proximate cause of the collision and re-
sulting damage, thus leaving to the jury 
the determination of the amount of such 
damage. Cederloff v. Whited, llO U. 45, 
169 P. 2d 777. 
2. Injury to pedestrians. 
Pedestrian denied recovery for injuries 
sustained when she was struck by over• 
hang of motorbus, where from the evi-
dence it appeared that when she was half-
way across the street the traffic light 
changed against her and she stopped in 
the safety zone, giving the other traffic 
the right of way, and that the overhang 
of the bus struck her as it rounded the 
corner in response to traffic officer's ex-
press direction. Miller v. Utah Light & 
Traction Co., 96 U. 369, 86 P. 2d 37. 
3. Proximate cause. 
Whether a truck driver was negligent in 
failing to look in rear view mirror at the 
time of a left turn, and whether his neg-
ligence, if any, was a proximate cause of 
the injury were questions for the jury. 
Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 U. (2d) 171, 263 
P. 2d 796. 
4. Signal for stopping or suddenly de-
creasing speed. 
Held that where statute required de-
fendant to give an appropriate signal be• 
fore stopping or suddenly decreasing his 
speed and no hand signal was given, the 
visible light showing the application of 
defendant's brakes was not compliance 
with the statute since it was simultaneous 
with the sudden decrease in speed, while 
the statute requires that an appropriate 
signal be given prior to stopping or sud-
denly decreasing the speed of a vehicle. 
United States v. First Security Bank, 208 
F. 2d 424, 42 A. L. R. 2d 951. 
5. Effect of infant's age and capacity up-
on statutory duty. 
Consideration of infant's age and capac-
ity should prevail over rule establishing 
negligence as a matter of law upon viola-
tion of statutory duty; this does not mean 
that statutory violation rule is nullified 
where children are involved. Morby v. 
Rogers, 122 U. 540, 252 P. 2d 231 ( case of 




60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 287. 
Construction and operation of regula-
tions as to sudden stop or slowing of 
motor vehicle, 29 A. L. R. 2d 5. 
Duty of motor vehicle driver approach• 
ing place where children are playing or 
gathered, to stop or slow down, 30 A. L. R. 
2d 1030. 
Failure of motorist to give signal for 
left turn between intersections, liability 
for accident arising from, 39 A. L. R. 2d 
103. 
Liability for accident arising out of 
motorist's failure to give signal for right 
turn, 38 A. L. R. 2d 143. 
Unsignaled stop or slowing of motor 
vehicle as negligence, 29 A. L. R. 2d 5. 
41-6-70. Signals-Method of giving-Signal lamps.-(a) The signals 
herein required shall be given either by means of the hand and arm or by 
a signal of a type approved by the state road commission, except as pro-
vided in paragraph (b). 
(b) Any motor vehicle in use on a highway shall be equipped with, 
and required signal shall be given by, a signal lamp or lamps, said lamps 
being of a type approved by the state road commission when the distance 
257 
41-6-71 MOTOR VEHICLES 
from the center of the top of the steering post to the left outside limit of 
the body, cab or load of such motor vehicle exceeds twenty-four inches, or 
when the distance from the center of the top of the steering post to the 
rear limit of the body or load thereof exceeds fourteen feet. The latter 
measurement shall apply to any single vehicle, also to any combination of 
vehicles. The requirements of this section shall become effective January 
1, 1958. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 57; C. 1943, 
57-7-134; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1 ; 1957, ch_ 
78, § 4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment added "except as 
provided in paragraph (b )" and deleted 
"but when a vehicle is so constructed or 
loaded that a hand and arm signal would 
not be visible both to the front and rear 
of such vehicle then said signals must be 
given by such a lamp or device" after 
"state road commission" in subsec. (a); 
and added subsec. (b). 
The 1957 amendment deleted "lamp or 
signal device" after "a signal" in subsec. 
(a); substituted "said lamps" for "or me-
chanical signal device, said lamps or de-
vices" in the first sentence and "1958" for 
"1956" in the last sentence of subsec. (b). 
41-6-71. Signals-Manner of giving.-.A.11 signals herein required given 
by hand and arm shall be given from the left side of the vehicle in the 
following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows : 
(1) Left turn. Hand and arm extended horizontally. 
(2) Right turn. Hand and arm extended upward. 
(3) Stop or decrease speed. Hand and arm extended downward. 










RIGHT OF WAY 
Right of way between vehicles. 
Yield right of way signs. 
Vehicle turning left at intersection. 
Vehicle entering a through highway. 
Failure to yield right of way-Effect of collision-Rule on enter-
ing stop or yield intersection. 
Entering highway from private road. 
Emergency vehicle-Duties of respective drivers. 
41-6-72. Right of way between vehicles.- (a) The driver of a vehicle 
approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which 
has entered the intersection from a different highway. 
(b) When two vehicles enter or approach an intersection from dif-
ferent highways at approximately the same time the driver of the vehicle 
on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right. 
( c) The right of way rule declared in paragraph (b) is modified at 
through highways and otherwise as hereinafter stated in this chapter. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §. 59; C. 1943, rule declared in paragraph (b) is" for 
57-7-136; L . 1961, ch. 86, § 1. "The foregoing rules are" in subsec. (c). 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment inserted "or ap-
proach" and "approximately" in subsec. 
(b), and substituted "The right of way 
1. Construction and application. 
In crowded street greater degree of care 
and vigilance is required in approaching 































































41-6-71 MOTOR VEHICLES 
from the center of the top of the steering post to the left outside limit of 
the body, cab or load of such motor vehicle exceeds twenty-four inches, or 
when the distance from the center of the top of the steering post to the 
rear limit of the body or load thereof exceeds fourteen feet. The latter 
measurement shall apply to any single vehicle, also to any combination of 
vehicles. The requirements of this section shall become effective January 
1, 1958. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 57; C. 1943, 
57-7-134; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957, cfb.. 
78, §4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment added "except as 
provided in paragraph (b )" and deleted 
"but when a vehicle is so constructed or 
loaded that a hand and arm signal would 
not be visible both to the front and rear 
of such vehicle then said signals must be 
given by such a lamp or device" after 
"state road commission" in subsec. (a); 
and added su bsec. (b). 
The 1957 amendment deleted "lamp or 
signal device" after "a signal" in su bsec. 
(a); substituted "said lamps" for "or me-
chanical signal device, said lamps or de-
vices" in the first sentence and "1958" for 
"1956" in the last sentence of subsec. (b). 
41-6-71. Signals-Manner of giving.-.All signals herein required given 
by hand and arm shall be given from the left side of the vehicle in the 
following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows: 
(1) Left turn. Hand and arm extended horizontally. 
(2) Right turn. Hand and arm extended upward. 
(3) Stop or decrease speed. Hand and arm extended downward. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 58; C. 1943, 
57-7-135. 
.ARTICLE 9 
RIGHT OF WAY 
Section 41-6-72. Right of way between vehicles. 
41-6-72.10. Yield right of way signs. 
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left at intersection. 
41-6-74. Vehicle entering a through highway. 
41-6-74.10. Failure to yield right of way-Effect of collision-Rule on enter-
ing stop or yield intersection. 
41-6-75. Entering highway from private road. 
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle-Duties of respective drivers. 
41-6-72. Right of way between vehicles.-(a) The driver of a vehicle 
approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which 
has entered the intersection from a different highway. 
(b) When two vehicles enter or approach an intersection from dif-
ferent highways at approximately the same time the driver of the vehicle 
on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right. 
( c) The right of way rule declared in paragraph (b) is modified at 
through highways and otherwise as hereinafter stated in this chapter. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §, 59; C. 1943, rule declared in paragraph (b) is" for 
57-7-136; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. "The foregoing rules are" in subsec. (c). 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment inserted "or ap-
proach" and "approximately" in subsec. 
(b), and substituted "The right of way 
1. Construction and application. 
In crowded street greater degree of care 
and vigilance is required in approaching 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-72.10 
pedestrians and vehicles of all kinds have 
rigl1t to pa ss both ways, than is case 
between str eet crossings. Richards v. 
Palace Laundry Co., 55 U. 409, 186 P. 439. 
The rights and duties prescribed by this 
section a re only r ela tiv e, and must be 
applied in th e light of the conditions exist-
ing at the time. It is the duty of both 
parties to use such caution as a r eason ably 
prudent person would have done in enter-
ing t he intersection. The right of way 
should be yielded if under the circum-
stances a reasonably prudent person would 
have done so. If failure to yield right of 
way proximately contributed to the acci-
dent, that may bar plaintiff or render 
defendant liable. Smith v. Lenzi, 74 U. 
362, 279 P. 893, applying former Motor 
Vehicle Law. 
The rights of the possessor of the right 
of way under this section are only rela-
tive, and one is not relieved of the duty 
of using due care simply b ecause he is 
the apparent possessor of the right of way. 
The question is: Whose negligence was 
the proximate cause of the accident and 
injury, and not simply who entered the 
intersection first. Sine v. Salt Lake 
Transp. Co., 106 U. 289, 147 P. 2d 875, 
following Bullock v. Luke, 98 U. 501, 98 
P. 2d 350. 
2. Duty to yield. 
Driver on left at street intersection is 
not required to yield right of way to 
driver appr oaching from right unless col-
lision is to be "reasonably apprehended." 
Collins v. Liddle, 67 U. 242, 247 P. 476. 
Duty of drivers at street intersections 
is discussed a t length in Sine v. Salt L ake 
Transp. Co., 106 U. 289, 147 P. 2d 875. 
Motorist approaching intersection from 
right had right of way over motorist 
approaching from left if former either 
reached intersection first or at same time 
as latter. Martin v. Sheffield, 112 U. 478, 
189 P. 2d 127. 
3. Evidence and questions for jury. 
In action arising out of intersection 
collision, evidence sufficiently established 
prima facie case of n egligence on part of 
defendant in failing to yield right of way 
and in traveling at excessive r a te of speed, 
and contributory negligence on pa1·t of 
plaintiff in failing to keep proper lookout 
and in traveling at excessive rate of speed 
was for jury. Martin v. Sheffield, 112 U. 
478, 189 P. 2d 127. 
The mere fact that a driver has the 
right of way does not excuse him from 
exercising due car e and keeping a proper 
lookout to avoid collisions with vehicles 
failing to yield, however, questions re-
lating to rights and duties of drivers 
approaching intersections are primarily 
problems to b e resolved by the trier of 
fact and only when reasonable minds could 
not differ in reaching a contrary determi-
n ation does it become necessary to upset 
these factual resolutions. Country Club 
Foods v. Barney, 10 U. (2d) 317, 352 P. 
2d 776. 
4. Contributory negligence of favored 
driver. 
Although driver approaching from right 
had right of way over driver approaching 
from left, right is not absolute and one 
who has it may not claim it in face of 
danger which one exercising due care could 
see and avoid; driver having right of way 
was nevertheless contributorily negligent 
in light of evidence that he had not kept 
proper lookout. Hughes v. Hooper, 19 U. 
(2d) 389, 431 P. 2d 983. 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese::>l 71( 4). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 363. 
Right of way, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 748 et seq., 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 198 et 
seq. 
Automobile crossing street at a point 
other than a street intersection, 57 A. L. 
R. 1106. 
Duty of driver of vehicle approaching 
intersection of one-way street with other 
street, 62 A. L. R. 2d 275. 
N egligence, right of way at street or 
highway intersections as dependent upon, 
or independent of, 89 A. L. R. 838, 136 
A. L. R. 1497. 
Right of way as between vehicles as 
affected by rela tive distances or time of 
reaching intersection, 175 A. L. R. 1013. 
Right of way at street or highway in-
tersections, 21 A. L. R. 974, 37 A. L. R. 
493, 47 A. L. R. 595, 136 A. L. R. 1497. 
Streetcar colliding with automobil e at 
intersection, liability for injuries, 28 A. 
L. R . 217, 46 A. L. R. 1000. 
What is street or highway intersection 
within traffic rules, 7 A. L. R. 3d 1204. 
41-6-72.10. Yield right of way signs.-(a) The state road commission 
with r eference to state highways, and local authorities, with reference to 
highways under their jurisdiction, may at certain intersections, where safety 
and efficiency require the normal right of way rule to be modified in favor of 
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one of the highways, erect and maintain yield right of way signs at such 
intersections on the minor approaches. 
(b) The yield right of way sign shall conform to the specifications 
outlined in the sign manual of the state road commission. 
(c) The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obe-
dience to such sign slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing 
conditions, or shall stop if necessary as provided in section 41-6-99, and 
shall yield the right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approach-
ing on another highway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard 
during the time when such driver is moving across or within the inter-
section. 
( d) If a driver of a vehicle approaches an intersection and finds a 
car has been stopped at yield right of way sign on an intersecting approach 
and has been waiting to enter and then starts to enter, the oncoming 
motorist shall yield the right of way to him in the same manner as if he had 
been waiting at a stop sign. 
History: c. 1953, 41-6-72.10, enacted by 
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "yield 
right of way signs" for "a yield right of 
way sign" in subsec. (a); restated subsec. 
( c) and included the provision as to stop-
ping and substituted "a driver of a ve-
hicle" for "motorist" in subsec. ( cl). 
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left at intersection.-The driver of a vehicle 
within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right of 
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within 
the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
during the time when such driver is moving within the intersection. 
History: L. 1941, ch, 52, § 60; C, 1943, 
57-7-137; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "dur-
ing the time when such driver is moving 
within the intersection" for "but said 
drtver, having so yielded and having given 
a signal when and as required by this act, 
may make such left turn and the drivers 
of all other vehicles approaching the 
intersection from said opposite direction 
shall yield the right of way to the vehicle 
making the left turn." 
1. Evidence. 
Where prosecution grew out of a col-
lision at an intersection, due to alleged 
reckless driving of defendant in making 
turn in violation of this section, Supreme 
Court thought "there was ample evidence 
of conduct of defendant which jury could 
properly find was reckless and in marked 
disregard for the rights and safety of 
others." State v. Newton, 105 U. 561, 144 
P. 2d 290. 
2. Instructions. 
There is no right to an instruction cov-
ering the qualifying part of this section, 
unless there is evidence to support such 
a charge. State v. Newton, 105 U. 561, 
144 P. 2cl 290. 
3. Fulfillment of duty. 
If the left-turner, in performing his duty 
under this section by making the required 
observa tion, sees no vehicle approaching, 
or that any coming are far enough away 
so that the left-turner can reasonably 
believe that he has time to make his turn, 
he may proceed. Where a clispute arises 
as to this point, the question is one for 
the jury to resolve in the light of the 
evidence submitted by the parties. Smith 
v. Gallegos, 16 U. (2cl) 344, 400 P. 2d 570. 
4. Involuntary manslaughter. 
Under a former section in R. S. 1933, 
which, however, is practically identical 
with this section, it was helcl, in reversing 
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, 
that no criminal liability is impo secl upon 
the defendant because he crossed the line 
of northbound traffic, unless he clid so 
recklessly or in willful or wanton disre-
gard of the rights and safety of others. 
State v. Adamson, 101 U. 534, 125 P. 2d 
429. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-74 
arising out of collision by defendant's car 
with car in which decedent was riding, 
wherein evidence showed that latter car, 
is making left turn short distance beyond 
intersection for purpose of entering inter-
secting street, had crossed almost com• 
pletely over two lan es for oncoming traffic 
and had made short backward movement 
before impact from defendant's oncoming 
automobile occurred, it could not be said 
as matter of law that left turn was not 
made in exercise of due care and, under 
all evidence, jury could find that, by reason 
of defendant's intoxicated condition, he 
failed to react in normal manner to situ-
ation which confronted him, and that his 
conduct was responsible cause of collision 
and resulting death. State v. McQuilkin, 
113 U. 268, 193 P. 2d 433, distinguishing 
Cederloff v. Whited, 110 U. 45, 169 P . 2d 
777. 
5. "Immediate hazard." 
In action arising out of collision be-
tween automobile driven by plaintiff and 
truck driven by defendant at intersection 
where plaintiff made left turn across path 
of approaching traffic , evidence conclusive-
ly established tha t truck was so close to 
intersection a t time plaintiff made left 
turn as to constitute an "immediate haz-
ard." French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 
U. 406, 216 P. 2d 1002, distinguished in 
Hardman v. Thurman, 121 U. 143, 239 P. 
2d 2.15. 
Where the defendant attempted to turn 
across the path of the plaintiff, when he 
was only 40 feet away, the trial court 
could reasonably conclude that plaintiff 
was so close as to constitute an immediate 
hazard and that the defendant should have 
yielded the right of way to him. Yeates v. 
Budge, 122 U. 518, 252 P. 2d 220, 222. 
6. Burden placed on driver making turn. 
When a statute prescribes tha t a turn-
ing vehicle must y ield the right of way 
to another on a straight of way when the 
latter is close enough to constitute a haz-
ard, it anticipates the exercise of reason• 
able judgment on the p art of the driver 
turning. However, a burden is placed on 
the driver making the turn as he has 
control of the situation, and if there is a 
reasonable probability that the movement 
cannot be made in safety then the dis-
favored driver should yield. French v. 
Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 U. 406, 216 P. 
2d 1002. 
Violation of statute. 
Motorist who signalled for left turn and 
had almost complet ed it when defendant, 
who had just started f rom parked position, 
collided with r ear end of motorist's car 
whil e trying to go through intersection, 
was not shown to have violated t his sec-
tion, notwithstanding that eviden ce was at 
best controversial and was somewhat 
based on estimates as to split-second cir-
cumstances as to time, distance and judg-
ment. H awkins v. Allen, 16 U. (2d) 293, 
400 P. 2d 12. 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese:,,171 ( 4). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 363. 
Cutting corners as negligence, 115 A. 
L . R. 1178. 
Liability for accident arising from fail-
ure of motorist to give signal for left turn 
at intersection as against motor vehicle 
proceeding in same direction, 39 A. L. R. 
2d 15. 
Liability for accident arising from f ail-
ure of motorist to give signal for left turn 
at intersection, as against oncoming or 
intersecting motor vehicle, 39 A. L. R. 2d 
65. 
Liability for accident arising from fail-
ure of motorist to give signal for left turn 
between intersections, 39 A. L. R. 2d 103. 
Rights and liabilities as between drivers 
of motor vehicles proceeding in the same 
direction, where one or both attempt to 
pass on left of another vehicle so proceed-
ing, 27 A. L . R. 2d 317. 
What is street or highway intersection 
within traffic rules, 7 A. L. R . 3d 1204. 
41-6-74. Vehicle entering a through highway.-[ (a)] The driver of 
a vehicle shall stop as required by this act at the entrance to a through 
highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have 
entered the intersection from said through highway or which are approach-
ing so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
but said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other 
vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield 





(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop 
sign as required herein at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at 
one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway 
and shall proceed cautiously, yield right of way to vehicles not so obliged 
to stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to 
constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 61; C. 1943, 
57-7-138; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "yield 
right of way" for "yielding" in subsec. (b). 
neither should be permitted to close his 
eyes to other vehicles which he knows 
or l1 as reason to believe are approaching, 
merely because statute or municipal ordi-
n ance designates l1im the preferred driver. 
Hickok v. Skinner, 113 U. 1, 190 P. 2d 514. 
The bra cketed subsection reference 
"(a)" was inserted by the compiler. Fact that pla intiff motorist, in crossing 
througl1 highway at intersection after hav-
ing stopped at stop sign, had right of 
way over defendant motorist on through 
highway by virtue of municipal ordinance 
conforming to this section, did not permit 
plaintiff, after having observed defend-
a nt's car approaching intersection, to 
thereafter completely ignore that car even 
though at time plaintiff started he might 
reasona bly l1ave believed that he had time 
in wl1ich to get safely across. (Rev. Ord. 
Salt Lake City 1944, § 6128(c) 2.) Hickok 
v. Skinner, 113 U. 1, 190 P. 2d 514. 
1. Construction and application. 
Defendant motorist on through l1igh-
way, who was approaching intersection 
400 to 500 feet therefrom at 45 miles per 
hour when plaintiff motorist attempted to 
cross highway at intersection after liaving 
stopped at stop sign, was not approaching 
so closely as to constitute "immediate 
hazard" within meaning of municipal ordi-
n ance conforming to this section, and 
therefore ordinance required defendant to 
yield right of way to plaintiff. (Rev. Ord. 
Salt Lake City 1944, § 6128 ( c) 2.) Hickok 
v. Skinner, 113 U. 1, 190 P. 2d 514. 
A person is not guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law in traversing au iutel'Sec-
tion at a speed of 5 or 6 miles per hour. 
It is a proper question to be a nswered by 
the jury under proper instructions. Bates 
v. Burns, 3 U. (2d) 180, 281 P. 2d 209. 
Driver may cross over arteria l high-
way after having stopped at stop sign, 
although he must yield right of way to 
cars wl1ich are close enough to constitute 
immediate hazard. Conklin v. Walsh, 113 
U. 276, 193 P. 2d 437. 
2. Immediate hazard. 
Wliere believable but controversial evi-
dence based on estimates of split-second 
circumstances showed that plaintiff had 
a lmost completed a left turn when de-
fendant, who had just pulled out of a 
parked position, collided with the rear 
end of plaintiff's vehicle while attempting 
to go through the intersection, the trial 
court, in its discretion, could find that 
defendant was negligent and plaintiff was 
nounegligeut; a nd the Supreme Court could 
not hold, as a matter of law, that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent in failing 
to yield right of way where there was a n 
immediate h azard. Hawkins v. Allen, 16 
U. (2d) 293, 400 P. 2d 12. 
3. Rights and duties of respective drivers. 
llegardless of which driver is technically 
entitled to right of way, both must use 
due ca1·e and caution in proceeding into 
and across intersection and both have 
burden to k eep proper lookout and to use 
reasonable care to a void collision, and 
Duty to keep proper lookout applies as 
well to favored as to disfavored driver, 
and neither can excuse his own failure to 
observe because other driver failed in l1is 
duty, and neither is excused for want of 
diligence or failure to see what is plain 
to be seen. Conklin v. Walsh, 113 U. 276, 
193 P . 2d 437. 
Driver on arterial highway has duty 
to l'emain reasonably alert to possibility 
of disfavored driver starting across inter-
section in belief that he can cross in safe-
ty. Conklin v. Walsh, 113 U. 276, 193 P. 
2d 437. 
A ' driver entering the intersection :first 
does not necessarily have the right of 
way. Williams v. Zions Cooperative Mer-
cantile Institution, 6 U. (2d) 283, 312 P. 
2d 564, 566. 
If the disfavored driver has made his 
stop a nd deferred to all vehicles that 
would be r equired to brake sharply or 
suddenly to a void collision, the cars far 
enough away to have a clear margin to 
observe and make a smooth, safe stop are 
not an "immediate hazard" and are re-
quired to yield. Richards v. Anderson, 9 
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4. Negligence, contributory negligence 
and last clear chance. 
Plaintiff motorist, who stopped at stop 
sign on intersecting street and observed 
clefendant's car 400 to 500 feet away on 
through highway approaching intersection 
at unknown speed, in starting forward 
from point 20 feet back from intersection 
ancl driving into and almost across inter-
section for distance of 65 feet without 
again looking in direction from which de-
fendant's car was approaching, was con-
tributorily negligent as matter of l aw, 
barring recovery for damages arising out 
of collision, notwithstanding that plaintiff 
hacl right of way over defendant by virtue 
of municipal ordinance conforming to this 
section, and even though plaintiff had con-
cluded upon observing defendant's car that 
he had time to clear intersection, and last 
clear chance doctrine was inapplicable. 
(Rev. Ord. Salt Lake City 1944, § 6128 
(c) 2.) Hickok v . Skinner, 113 U. 1, 190 
P. 2d 514. 
Driver of truck traveling between 30 
and 45 miles per hour on arterial high-
way who, when at least one-quarter of 
block from intersection, observed car ap-
proaching from his left which was closer 
to intersection than truck, but did not 
again look in direction of car until it was 
too late to avoid collision because of as-
sumption that truck had right of way by 
virtue of stop sign, was negligent as mat-
ter of l aw. Conklin v. W alsh, 113 U . 276, 
193 P. 2d 437. 
Plaintiff motorist driving on preferred 
highway, who had ample time to observe 
and avoid a collision with defendant mo-
torist entering the highway, was guilty 
of contributory negligence. Richards v . 
Anderson, 9 U. (2d) 17, 337 P. 2d 59 . 
5. Immediate hazard. 
There is no precise set of measurements 
by which an immediate hazard can be 
gauged, but it must be judged on the 
basis of common sense in the light of the 
existing circumstances. Richards v. An-
derson, 9 U. (2d) 17, 337 P. 2c1 59. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles@:::>171 (2). 
GOA C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 350. 
Rights and duties at intersection of 
arterial ( or other favored) highway and 
nonfavored highway, 58 A. L. R. 1197, 
81 A. L. R. 185. 
41-6-74.10. Failure to yield right of way-Effect of collision-Rule on 
entering stop or yield intersection.-Yield right of way. (a) In the event 
that a driver, after having driven past a yield sign or a stop sign, is 
involved in a collision with a pedestrian having right of way in a cross-
walk or a vehicle having right of way in the intersection such collision shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence of his failure to yield the right of way as 
required by this section, but shall not be considered negligence per se in 
determining legal liability for such accident. 
(b) Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection. Except when directed 
to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, every driver of a 
vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall 
stop as required by section 41-6-99 and after having stopped shall yield the 
right of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another 
highway or which is approaching so closely on another highway as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving 
across or within the intersection. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-74.10, enacted by 
L. 1961, ch. 86, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending sections 41-6-2, 41-6-3, 
!1-6-4, 41-6-5, and 41-6-9, Utah Code An-
notated 1953; section 41-6-14, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
71, Laws of Utah 1955; section 41-6-17, 
41-6-24, 41-6-27, 41-6-29, 41-6-35, 41-6-37, 
and 41-6-72, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
section 41-6-72.10, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended by chapter 71, L aws of 
Utah 1955; section 41-6-73, 41-6-74, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-80, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-82, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by 
chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955; section 
41-6-97, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 65, Laws of 1949; 
section 41-6-98, and 41-6-99, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; section 41-6-100.10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amencled by 




41-6-123, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 
1955; section 41-6-140, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended by chapter 71, 
Laws of Utah 1955; section 41-6-140.10, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-
140.20, Utal1 Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 
1955; section 41-6-145, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953; section 41-6-150, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; section 41-6-160, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by 
chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957, pertaining 
to regulating traffic on highways; and 
enacting new sections to be known as 
41-6-74.10, 41-6-148.10, 41-6-148.30, 41-6-
148.40, and 41-6-169.10, respecting safety 
belts, modifying the structure of vehicles, 
safety chains on trailers, and obeying 
commands of a police officer. 
l. Operation and effect. 
Where the evidence was unclear as to 
whether defendant's entry into a regulated 
intersection constituted an "immediate 
hazard" to the plaintiff, such question 
should have been given to the jury and it 
was error for the trial judge to instruct 
that the occurrence of a collision was 
prima facie evidence that plaintiff had the 
right of way. Johnson v. Cornwall Ware-
house Co., 15 U. (2d) 172, 389 P. 2d 710. 
41-6-75. Entering highway from private road.-The driver of a vehicle 
about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall 
yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said highway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 62; C. 1943, 57-7-139. 
established in Utah, not only where the 
defendant actually knew of plaintiff's 
peril, but also where defendant, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have 
known that plaintiff was so endangered. 
Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 U. (2d) 210, 282 P. 2d 309. 
1. Contributory negligence. 
Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, where 
plaintiff, driving at 25 miles per hour on 
icy highway, :first saw defendant's bus 
being backed out of yard when plaintiff 
was approximately 300 feet from defend-
ant's driveway, and plaintiff applied his 
brakes when about half the distance 
from the driveway upon realizing that de-
fendant was not going to yield right of 
way, but was unable to avoid collision 
with defendant who had backed entirely 
across road. Nielson v. Mauchley, 115 U. 
68, 202 P. 2d 547. 
2. Rights and duties of drivers. 
This section does not give driver of 
vehicle wl10 has right of way the right 
As a general rule the doctrine of last 
clear chance is of limited application in 
tl10 case of two moving vehicles as the 
application of the doctrine in a case where 
both vehicles were moving and rapidly 
changing positions with respect to one an-
other is fraught with difficulties. However, 
where one vehicle is moving very slowly 
this limitation of the doctrine is much 
less cogent. Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 U. 
(2d) 210, 282 P. 2d 309. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~167 (3 ). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 347. 
to proceed without regard to existing 
conditions, and such driver must exercise 
due care and act as reasonably prudent 
man would act under all existing circum-
stances. Nielson v. Mauchley, 115 U. 68, 
202 P. 2d 547. 
Duty at private crossing or driveway, 24 A. L. R. 946. 
3. Last clear chance doctrine. 
The doctrine of last clear chance is well 
Private driveway, right of way as be-
tween vehicles in street or highway and 
vehicles approaching from, 50 A. L. R. 283. 
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle-Duties of respective drivers,-(a) Upon 
the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of 
audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of this act, the driver 
of every other vehicle shall yield the right of way and shall immediately 
drive to a position parallel to, and as elose as possible to, the right-hand edge 
or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain 
in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except 
when otherwise directed by a police officer. 
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(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized 
emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety 
of all persons using the highway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 63; C. 1943, 
57-7-140; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 
71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "equipped 
with a least one lighted lamp exhibiting 
red light visible under normal atmospheric 
conditions from a distance of 500 feet 
to the front of such vehicle and" after 
"authorized emergency vehicle" the first 
time it appears in subsec. (a). 
The 1955 amendment deleted the pro-
vision inserted in 1949 and substituted 
"making use of audible and visual signals 
meeting the requirements of this act" for 
"when the driver is giving audible signal 
by siren, exhaust whistle or bell." 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~175(3). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 371. 
Policeman, right of way of vehicle car-
rying, 65 A. L . R. 140. 
Validity of statute or ordinance giving 
right of way in streets or highways to 
certain classes of vehicles, 38 A. L . R. 24. 
ARTICLE 10 
PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
Section 41-6-77. Crossing at intersection or elsewhere-Obedience to traffic-control 
signals- Authority by local ordinance to prohibit crossing except 
in crosswalk. 
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way. 
41-6-79. Pedestrians shall yield right of way-Crosswalks-Crossing intersec-
tions diagonally. 
41-6-80. Repealed. 
41-6-80.1. Drivers to yield right of way to blind persons-Exceptions- Use of 
cane. 
41-6-81. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks. 
41-6-82. Walking along or upon roadways-Standing in roadway for prohib-
ited purposes. 
41-6-77. Crossing at intersection or elsewhere-Obedience to traffic-
control signals-Authority by local ordinance to prohibit crossing except 
in crosswalk.-(a) Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic-control signals at 
intersections as heretofore declared in this act, but at all other places 
pedestrians shall be accorded the privileges and shall be subject to the 
restrictions stated in this act. 
(b) Local authorities are hereby empowered by ordinance to require 
that pedestrians shall strictly comply with the directions of any official 
traffic-control signal and may by ordinance prohibit pedestrians from 
crossing any roadway in a business district or any designated highways 
except in a crosswalk. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 64; C. 1943, 
57-7-141; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, 
§ 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added sub sec. (b), 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
The 1955 amendment substituted "re-
strictions stated in this act" for "follow-
ing restrictions" in su bsec. (a) . 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~5-7, 160(3). 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 35; 60A C.J.S. 
Motor Vehicles § 384. 
Rights and duties of pedestrians, 7 Am. 
Jur. 2d 795 et seq., Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 242 et seq. 
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way.-(a) When traffic-control signals 







't I ., 
't I . ' ' 
41-6-78 MOTOR VEHICLES 
right of way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian 
crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon 
the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the 
pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway 
as to be in danger, but no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other 
piace of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so 
close that it is impossible for the driver to yield. This provision shall not 
apply under the conditions stated in section 41-6-79 (b). 
(b) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at 
any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross 
the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear 
shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 65; C. 1943, 
57-7-142; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment deleted "approach-
ing so closely from the opposite half of 
the roadway as to be in danger," after 
"the pedestrian is" in subsec. (a). 
1. Duty of driver to yield right of way. 
Statutes or ordinances giving pedes-
trians the right of way at street crossings 
create a preferential but not an absolute 
right in the pedestrian's favor, and before 
the duty of a driver to yield the right of 
way arises, he must be in a situation 
whereby he is either aware of the presence 
of the pedestrian or should have, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, become aware 
of the presence of the pedest r ian in time 
to yield the right of way. Charvoz v. 
Cottrell, 12 U. (2d) 25, 361 P. 2d 516. 
2. Rights and duties of pedestrians gen-
erally-Contributory negligence. 
Rights of pedestrians to use public 
streets are same as those of motorists and 
hence same general duties devolve upon 
them, and pedestrian crossing public street 
in crosswalk or pedestrian lane, although 
he may have right of way over vehicular 
traffic, has duty to observe such traffic, 
so that pedestrian who undertakes to cross 
busy street of large city, without first 
observing for vehicular traffic, is guilty 
of contributory negligence, even though 
he may be crossing in crosswalk and have 
right of way. Mingus v. Olsson, 114 U. 505, 
201 P. 2d 495, where deceased pedestrian 
who was struck by car while crossing street 
on crosswalk in Salt Lake City was held 
to be contributorily negligent as matter of 
law in failing to keep proper lookout for 
approaching traffic. 
In determining whether it must be ruled 
.as a matter of law that a pedestrian her-
·self .was n egligent which contributed to 
cause her injury, consideration must be 
given, not only the fact that she had the 
right of way upon which she could place 
some reliance, but also that a pedestrian 
crossing a busy street must be constantly 
v igilant for her safety with r espect to all 
of the conditions around her. Even if a 
car is seen approaching, unless it is so 
positioned as to constitute an immediate 
hazard to her, she is not necessarily 
obliged to focus full and undivided atten-
tion on that particular car and so calculate 
her entire conduct as to avoid being struck 
by it. She need not anticipate that the 
driver will speed, fail to observe, or to 
control his car, or fail to afford her the 
right of way, or otherwise be negligent 
unless in due care she observes or should 
observe something to warn her of such 
improper conduct. This is not to say t hat 
a pedestrian may claim a right of way in 
face of danger. She must of course be 
watching for a utomobiles or other vehicles 
on the street, particularly from the di-
rection whence traffic was most likely to 
come. But due care requires that she also 
keep a lookout ahead for other pedes-
trians, possible holes or obstructions in 
the street, and at least remain aware of 
the possibility of other traffic. Coombs v. 
Perry, 2 U. (2d) 381, 275 P. 2d 680. 
3. Right of way. 
A pedestrian in a marked crosswalk has 
the right of way. The right of way rule 
simply means this: that if two persons 
are so proceeding that if they continued 
their course there would be danger of 
collision, the disfavored one must give 
way, and the favored one (the pedestrian) 
may proceed; and the favored one may 
assume that this will be done. It is of 
course r ecognized that the right of way 
rule would not apply if, when the favored 
one approached the crossing point, the 
disfavored one was so close that in due 
care he could not or should not reasonably 
be expected to give way. Coombs v. Perry, 
2 U. (2d) 381, 275 P. 2d .6~0. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-79 
4. Crosswalks. 
Formerly a pedestrian was r equired to 
use crosswalks provided such crossing was 
within 300 feet of another regular crossing 
of same highway. Morgan v. Bingham 
Stage Lines Co., 75 U. 87, 283 P. 160. 
5. Instructions on "sudden emergency." 
It was not error for the trial court to 
refuse to give an instruction on sudden 
emergency where the plaintiff's requested 
instruction did not cover the requisite 
element that the emergency must be one 
which arose without fault on the part of 
the plaintiff and defendant's evidence 
showed that plaintiff ran in front of de-
fendant's vehicle when _ the latter was too 
close to avoid striking him. Gittens v. 
Lundberg, 3 U. (2d) 392, 284 P. 2d 1115. 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese=:>160 ( 4 ). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 388. 
Right of way as between pedestrian and 
vehicles, 7 Am. Jur, 2d 759-761, Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 207-209. 
Darting or stepping suddenly into path 
of car, 65 A. L. R. 192, 113 A. L. R. 528. 
Duty to look before crossing street or 
highway, 79 A. L. R. 1073. 
Duty to look for vehicles approaching 
on intersecting street, 9 A. L. R. 1248, 44 
A. L. R . 1299. 
41-6-79. Pedes.trians, shall yield right of way-Crosswalks-Crossing 
intersections diagonally.-(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at 
any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked 
crosswalk at an intersection shall yield ·the right of way to all vehicles 
upon the roadway. 
(b) Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian 
tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the 
right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway. 
(c) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic control signals 
are in op eration pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked 
crosswalk. 
( d) No pedestrian shall cross a roadway inters_ection diagonally unless 
authorized by official traffic-control devices; and, when authorized to cross 
diagonally, pedestrians shall cross only in accordance with the official 
traffic-control devices pertaining to such crossing movements. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 66; C. 1943, trian was duty bound to yield the right of 
57-7-143; L. 1969, ch. 110, § 1. way to a vehicle upon the roadway. Cox v. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment added subsec. (cl). 
1, Construction and application. 
Pedestrian was contributorily negligent 
as matter of law, where he proceeded to 
cross street ·at night at place other than 
marked crosswalk, knowing that there 
were traffic control lights and marked 
crosswalks at adjacent intersections, and 
failed to constantly observe movement of 
approaching traf-fic after r eaching a po-
sition approximately eight feet past center 
of street. Sant v. Miller, 115 U. 559, 206 
P. 2d 719. 
Pedestrian who was walking across poor-
ly lit highway was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law where, in response to 
a call from his wife, he tmnecl and walked 
directly into path of defendant's automo-
bile. Crossing a highway at a point where 
there was no marked crosswalk, the pedes-
Thompson, 123 U. 81, 254 P. 2d 1047, 1051. 
Exclusion of rebuttal testimony as to 
motorist's speed and refusal to reopen case 
to permit introauction of such testimony 
was not prejudicial error in suit to recover 
fo r death of pedestrian who was struck 
while crossing street in area other tha n 
marked crosswalk since there was evidence 
as to decedent's negligence. Duncan v. 
Western Refrigeration Co., 11 U. (2d) 19, 
354 P. 2d 572. 
2. Operation and effect. 
The right of way statutes are designed 
to prevent an accident by two persons, 
both otherwise lawfully on the roadway, 
reaching the same place at the same time. 
The right of way is not absolute for either 
pedestrian or motorist, but both have a 
continuing duty at all times to use reason-
able care for the safety of others, even 
when one has the right of way over the 
other. Langlois v . Rees, 10 U. (2d) 272 
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3. Contributory negligence. 
A pedestrian was guilty of contributory 
negligence where after walking across two 
lanes of a four-lane highway within a 
marked crosswalk she left the crosswalk 
and walked down the center of the street. 
By attempting to cross the street in dis-
regard of safety rules, she was charged 
with a high standard of care, the duty 
being commensurate with the perilous cir-
cumstances. Smith v . Bennett, 1 U. (2d) 
224, 265 P. 2d 401. 
4. Instruction on subsection (a). 
An instruction given literally in accord 
with subsection (a) of this section was 
not erroneous for failure to add "so near 
as to constitute an immediate hazard" 
since there were no circumstances requir-
ing such addition. Holmes v. Heidebrecht, 
10 U. (2d) 74, 348 P. 2d 565. 
An instruction in the words of subsec-
tion (a) of this section simply means that 
where two persons are proceeding in such 
manner that if they continued there would 
41-6-80. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 41-6-80 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 67; C. 
1943, 57-7-144; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1) re-
lating to driver's duty to exercise due care 
be a collision, the disfavored one must 
give way and the favored one may pro-
ceed. It does not mean that the favored 
one may claim the right of way over the 
disfavored one regardless of the hazards 
involved. Fox v. Taylor, 10 U. (2d) 174, 
350 P. 2d 154. 
5. Pedestrian walking along driveway. 
Motorist's general duty to stop before 
crossing sidewalk was not applicable to 
situation in which pedestrian was walking 
along driveway and was not on a sidewalk 
when struck by car backing from garage; 
both parties had duty to use due care for 
safety of themselves and each other. Ivie 
v. Richardson, 9 U. (2d) 5, 33,6 P. 2d 781. 
Collateral lteferences. 
Automobiles~160(1) . 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 389. 
Crossing street at unusual place or 
diagonally, 14 A. L. R. 1176, 67 A. L . R. 
313. 
on observing a child, incapacitated person, 
or a person with a white cane or guide 
dog, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 111, 
§ 7. For present provisions, see 41-6-80.1. 
41-6-80.1. Drivers to yield right of way to blind persons-Exceptions-
Use of cane.-(1) The driver of a motor vehicle approaching a blind or 
partially blind pedestrian crossing a roadway or thoroughfare, carrying a 
cane predominantly white or metallic in color (with or without a red tip) 
or using a guide dog, shall bring his vehicle to a complete stop and yield 
the right of way to the blind person. Any person who fails to stop and yield 
the right of way shall be liable for any loss or damage which results as 
a proximate cause of failure to yield the right of way to blind persons; 
except that blind or partially blind persons shall exercise due care in 
approaching and crossing said roadways and thoroughfares and shall 
yield right of way to emergency vehicles sounding a bell, a siren or 
other noise device. 
(2) A person blind or partially blind, and no other person, may 
carry a cane as described in subsection (1) . 
History: L. 1969, ch. 111, § 3. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 7 of Laws 1969, ch. 111, pro-
vided: "Section 41-6-80, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, as amended by Chapter 86, 
Laws of Utah, 1961, is repealed." 
Cross-Reference. 
Rights and privileges of blind and dis-
abled persons, 26-28-1 et seq. 
41-6-81. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks.-Pedestrians shall 
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History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 68; O. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-145. Automobiles~160 ( 4). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 389. 
41-6-82. Walking along or upon roadways-Standing in roadway for 
prohibited purposes.-(a) Where sidewalks are provided it shall be un-
lawful for any pedestrians to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway. 
(b) Where sidewalks are not provided any pedestrians walking along 
and upon a highway shall when practicable walk only on the left side of 
the roadway or its shoulder facing traffic which may approach from the 
opposite direction. 
(c) No person shall stand in a roadway for the purpose of soliciting 
from the occupant of any vehicle a ride, employment, the parking, watch-
ing or guarding of a vehicle or other business. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 69; O. 1943, 
57-7-146; L. 1949, ch. 65 § 1; 1955, ch. 71, 
§ 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment designated the text 
of the former section prohibiting solicita-
tion of rides as su bsec. ( c), and added 
the provisions of sub secs. (a) and (b). 
The 1955 amendment rewrote subsec. (c) 
to add the prohibitions against soliciting 
employment, parking, watching or guard-
ing a vehicle or other business. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "pe-
destrians" for "pedestrian" in subsecs. 
(a) and (b), and made a minor change 
in phraseology in subsec. (c). 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~l46. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Anti-hitchhiking laws, their construction 
and effect in action for injury to hitch-
hiker, 18 A. L. R. 1447, 68 A. L . R. 2d 300. 
Walking on left-hand side of road, 67 
A. L. R. 96, 93 A. L. R. 551. 
ARTICLE 11 
BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION 
Section 41-6-83. Parents and guardians shall not authorize violations of act-Regu-
lations applicable to bicycles. 
41-6-84. Bicycle riders subject to act, 
41-6-85. Operation of bicycle--More than one person prohibited to ride . 
41-6-86. Persons on bicycles, skates and sleds not to a ttach to vehicles. 
41-6-87. Riding of bicycle on and use of roadway-Bicyclist's duties. 
41-6°88. Rider to keep at least one hand on handle bars. 
41-6-89. Bell or other audible signal-Brake. 
41-6-90. Bicycles operated at night-Lights required. 
41-6-83. Parents and guardians shall not authorize violations of act-
Regulations applicable to bicycles.-(a) The parent of any child and the 
guardian of any ward shall not authorize or knowingly permit any such 
child or ward to violate any of the provisions of this act. 
(b) These regulations applicable to bicycles shall apply whenever 
a bicycle is operated upon any highway or upon any path set aside for the 
exclusive use of bicycles subject to those exceptions stated herein. 




60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396. 
Bicyclists, 8 Am. Jur. 2d 106 et seq., 









41-6-84 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-84. Bicycle riders subject to act.-Every person riding a bicycle 
upon a roadway shall be subject to the provisions of this act applicable 
to the driver of a vehicle except as to special regulations in this act and 
except as to those provisions of this act which by their nature can have 
no application. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 71; C. 1943, 
57-7-148. 
Cross-Reference. 
Driving on right side of highway, ex-
ceptions, 41-6-53. 
1. Child bicycle rider. 
The child bicycle rider must exercise 
that deg1·ee of care which ordinarily would 
be observed by children of the same age, 
intelligence, and experience under similar 
circumstances, and whether a child acted 
negligently is a question for the jury 
to decide according to this standard. 
Donohue v. Rolando, 16 U. (2d) 294, 400 
P. 2d 12. 
41-6-85. Operation of bicycle-More than one person prohibited to ride. 
-(a) A person propelling a bicycle shall not ride other than upon the 
permanent and regular seat attached thereto, nor carry any other person 
upon such bicycle other than upon a firmly attached and regular seat 
thereon nor shall any person ride upon a bicycle other than as above 
authorized. 
(b) No bicycle shall be used to carry more persons at one time than 
the number for which it is designed and equipped. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 72; C, 1943, 
57-7-149, 
41-6-86. Persons on bicycles, skates and sleds not to attach to vehicles. 
-No person riding upon any bicycle, coaster, roller skates, sled, or toy 
vehicle shall attach the same or himself to any vehicle upon a roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C. 19'43, 
57-7-150, 
41-6-87. Riding of bicycle on and use of roadway-Bicyclist's duties.-
( a) Every person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall ride as 
near to the right side of the roadway as practicable, exercising due care 
when passing a standing vehicle or one proceeding in the same direction. 
(b) Persons riding bicycles upon a roadway shall not ride more than 
two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the ex-
clusive use of bicycles. 
( c) Wherever . a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent 
to a roadway bicycle riders shall use such path and shall not use the 
roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 74; C. 1943, 
57-7-151; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment designated the text 
of the former section as subsec. (b) and 
added the provisions of subsecs. (a) and 
( c). 
1. Contributory negligence. 
The rule in this jurisdiction that a law 
violation is negligence as a matter of law 
does not overcome the rule that the con-
tributory negligence of a child is to be 
determined according to the proper stand-
ard of care with which he is charged. It 
does not mean that the statutory violation 
rule is nullified where children are in-
volved. If the violation of a statute by a 
child is found to evidence less care than 
that which ordinarily could be expected 
of a child of the same age, intelligence, 
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knowledge, and experience, he could be 
held contributorily negligent barring his 
recovery. On an issue of contributory 
negligence this measuring and judging the 
accountability of children of immature age 
is ordinarily to be left to a jury as a 
question of fact about which there might 
be reasonable difference of opinion. Morby 
v. Rogers, 122 U. 540, 252 P. 2d 231. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles@:::::>162 (7) . 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396. 
Reciprocal duties of driver of automo-
bile and bicyclist, 172 A. L. R. 736. 
41-6-88. Ride·r to keep at least one hand on handle bars.-No person rid-
ing a bicycle shall carry any package, bundle, or article which prevents 
the rider from keeping at least one hand upon the handle bars. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 75; C. 1943, 
57-7-152. 
41-6-89. Bell or other audible signal-Brake.-(a) No person shall 
ride a bicycle unless it is equipped with a bell or other device capable of 
giving a signal audible for a distance of at least 100 feet; except that no 
bicycle shall be equipped with nor shall any person use upon a bicycle any 
siren or whistle. 
(b) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake which will enable 
the operator to make the braked wheels skid on dry, level, clean pavement. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 76; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
57-7-153; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. The 1949 amendment added sub sec. (b). 
41-6-90. Bicycles operated at night-Lights required.-Every bicycle 
operated during the nighttime shall be equipped with a lamp on the front 
exhibiting a white light visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the 
front and with a red reflector on the rear of a type approved by the state 
road commission which shall be visible from fifty to 300 feet to the rear 
when directly in front of lawful upper beams of head lamps on a motor 
vehicle. A red light visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear may be 
used in addition to the red reflector. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 77; C. 1943, 
57-7-154; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment inserted "red" be-
fore "reflector" and substituted "of a type 
* * * on a motor vehicle" for "meeting 
the requirements of this act" after "on 
the rear" in the first sentence. 
1. Violation as negligence. 
Riding of bicycle in dark without lamp 
was violation of ordinance and this statute 
and thus established some negligence as a 
matter of law; whether absence of lamp 
was contributing proximate cause of colli-
sion between bicycle and taxicab was jury 
question. Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 122 U. 312, 
249 P . 2d 213. 
ARTICLE 12 
RAILROAD TRAINS AND SAFETY ZONES 
Section 41-6-91. Passing railroad trains. 
41-6-92. Passing while discharging passengers. 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks. 
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone. 
41-6-91. Passing railroad trains.-The driver of a vehicle shall not 
overtake and pass upon the left any railroad train proceeding in the same 
271 
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direction, whether actually in motion or temporarily at rest. This provision 
shall not apply on one-way streets nor upon streets where the tracks are 
so located as to prevent compliance with the rule nor where a police officer 
may direct otherwise. 




60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268. 
Safety measures and precautions, 44 Am. 
Jur. 598 et seq., Railroads § 384 et seq. 
41-6-92. Passing while discharging passengers.-The driver of a vehicle 
overtaking any railroad train stopped or about to stop for the purpose of 
receiving or discharging any passenger shall stop such vehicle to the rear 
of the nearest running board or door of such train and keep it stationary 
until any such passenger has boarded such train or reached a place of 
safety, except that where a safety zone has been established a vehicle 
need not be stopped before passing any such train, but may proceed past 
such train at a speed not greater than is reasonable and proper, and with 
due caution for the safety of pedestrians. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 79; C. 1943, 
57-7-156. 
1. Stopping behind streetcars. 
Former statute providing that motorists 
should not stop in rear of streetcar 
stopped for purpose of receiving or dis-
charging passengers, held applicable only 
when streetcar was headed in same diree-
tion as motorist. Williams v. Globe Grain 
& Milling Co., 64 U. 82, 228 P. 192, apply-
ing Comp. Laws 1917, § 3977, as amended 
by Laws 1921, ch. 83 (since repealed). 
Motorist proceeding down street in 
westerly direction passing stopped street-
car headed in opposite direction which 
obstructed view had right of way as 
against driver of omnibus traveling in 
easterly direction and making left turn 
behind streetcar to proceed into alley. 
Williams v. Globe Grain & Milling Co., 
64 U. 82, 228 P. 192. 
The purpose of law relating to street-
cars was to avoid accidents to persons 
about to board or leave streetcars. The 
motor vehicle had to stop behind the 
streetcar. Morgan v. Bingham Stage 
Lines Co., 75 U. 87, 96, 283 P. 160, ap-
plying Comp. Laws 1917, § 3977, as amend-
ed by Laws 1921, ch. 83 (since repealed). 
Collateral References. 
Liability of owner or operator of motor 
vehicle for injury to person who has 
alighted from or is waiting for streetcar 
or bus, 47 A. L. R. 1233, 123 A. L. R. 791. 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks.-(a) It is unlawful for the driver of any 
vehicle proceeding upon any track in front of a railroad train upon a street 
to fail to remove such vehicle from the track as soon as practicable after 
signal from the operator of such train. 
(b) When a railroad train has started to cross an intersection no 
driver of a vehicle shall drive upon or cross the tracks or in the path 
of such train within the intersection in front of such train. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 80; C. 1943, 
57-7-157. 
Collateral References. 
Liability for accident at point where 
highway leads to, but does not cross, 
railroad tracks, 47 A. L. R. 863. 
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone.-No vehicle shall at any time be 
driven through or within a safety zone. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 81; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-158. AutomobilesP147. 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268. 
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Liability of owner of motor vehicle for Validity of safety zone ordinance, 79 
injury to person who has alighted from A. L. R . 1328. 
or is waiting for streetcar, 47 A. L. R. 
1233, 123 A. L. R. 791. 
ARTICLE 13 
SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED 
Section 41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing-Duty to stop-Driving through, around 
or under gate or barrier prohibited. 
41-6-96. Stop signs at dangerous railroad crossings. 
41-6-97. Railroad grade crossing-Duty of buses and certain trucks to stop, 
look and listen-Exceptions. 
41-6-98. Duties respecting crawler type tractor, power shovel, derrick or 
other equipment or structure. 
41-6-99. Designation of through highways and stop intersections-Stop or 
Yield Right of Way signs-Erection and location-Lettering 
and illumination-Duty and place to stop. 
41-6-100. Vehicle emerging from alley, driveway or building-Duty to stop 
and yield right of way. 
41-6-100.10. School bus-Signs and light signals-Duty to stop for school bus 
-Operation of signals. 
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop - Driving through, 
around or under gate or barrier prohibited.-(a) Whenever any person 
driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver of such 
vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than ten feet from the near-
est track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do so safely 
when: 
(1) A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warn-
ing of the immediate approach of a train. 
(2) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a human flagman gives or 
continues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a train. 
(3) A railroad train approaching within approximately 1,500 feet 
of the highway crossing emits a signal audible from such distance and 
such train by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is an im-
mediate hazard. 
( 4) An approaching train is plainly visible and is in hazardous prox-
imity to such crossing. 
(b) No person shall drive any vehicle through, around 
crossing gate or barrier at a railroad crossing while such 
rier is closed or is being opened or closed. 
or under any 
gates or bar-
History: L . 1941, ch. 52, § 82; C. 1943, at a railroad crossing in another state, 
57-7-159; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. the plaintiff's counsel may testify that he 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added the 
subsection designation (a) to the first 
paragraph; changed the designation of 
subdivisions in subsec. (a) from letters 
to numbers; added subd. ( 4) to subsec. 
(a); and added subsec. (b). 
1. Law of foreign state. 
In an action for the death of a person 
who was killed by the defendant's train 
made a search, and that the statutes of 
the other state concerning stopping at 
crossings made no reference to train-ac-
tivated signals. Toomer' s Estate v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 121 U. 37, 239 P. 2d 163. 
Collateral References. 
Railroadse::>327 (1). 
75 C.J.S. Railroads § 773. 
Train operation and service, 44 Am. 
Jur. 572 et seq., Railroads § 357 et seq. 
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Duty of automobilist to shut off motor to stop at railroad crossing before cross-
at railroad crossing, 54 A. L. R. 542. ing, 56 A. L. R 647, 91 A. L. R. 1055. 
Duty of driver whose view is obstructed 
41-6-96. Stop s1g11s at dangerous railroad crossings.-The state road 
comm1ss1on with reference to state highways, and local authorities with 
reference to highways under their jurisdiction are authorized to designate 
particularly dangerous highway grade crossings of railroads and to erect 
stop signs thereat. When such stop signs are erected, the driver of any 
vehicle shall stop within fifty feet, but not less than ten feet from the 
nearest track of such grade crossing and shall proceed only upon exercising 
due care and observing that no train or trains are approaching. 
History : L. 1941, ch. 52, § 83; C. 1943, 
57-7-160; L. 1945, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1945 amendment substituted "state 
road commission" for "state road commis-
sioner" and inserted "with reference to 
state * * * their jurisdiction" in the first 
sentence, and added "and observing * * * 
approaching" to the second sentence. 
41-6-97. Railroad grade crossing-Duty of buses and certain trucks 
to stop, look and listen-Exceptions.-(a) The driver of every 
(1) Bus, as defined in this act, transporting passengers. 
(2) School bus transporting school children. 
(3) Motor vehicle transporting explosive substances or flammable 
liquids in quantities in excess of 100 gallons, as a cargo or part of a cargo. 
( 4) Tank truck for transporting flammable liquids, whether loaded or 
empty, and 
(5) Motor vehicle transporting corrosive liquids in cargo tanks 
before crossing at grade any track or tracks or railroads, or motor vehicle 
transporting fissionable materials/ shall stop such vehicle within fifty feet 
but not less than ten feet from the nearest rail of such railroads and while so 
stopped shall listen and look in both directions along such track for any 
approaching train, and for signals indicating the approach of a train, except 
as hereinafter provided, and shall not proceed until he can do so safely. 
After stopping as r equired herein and upon proceeding when it is safe 
to do so the driver of any said vehicle shall cross only in such gear of the 
vehicle that there will be no necessity for changing gears while traversing 
such crossing and the driver shall not shift gears while crossing the track 
or tracks. 
(b) No stop need be made at any such crossing where a police officer 
or a traffic-control signal directs traffic to proceed. 
( c) Unless a railroad train is approaching, any vehicle listed in 
(a) above may proceed without stopping, but at a speed not exceeding 
twenty-five (25) miles per hour, at any highway grade crossing of a 
railroad where a distinctive sign is displayed indicating that the public 
service commission of Utah, after hearing, has approved that no stop 
need be made. 
History: L . 1941, ch. 52, § 84; C. 1943, 
57-7-161; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 
86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment made changes in 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-99 
The 1961 amendment inserted "or motor 
vehicle transporting fissionable mat erials," 
ancl made minor changes in phra seology in 
subsec. (a). 
•rt would appear that the reference to 
"motor vehicle transporting fissionable ma-
terial" should have been added as a 
numb ered subdivision of subsec. (a) and 
ahead of the provision beginning "before 
crossing at grade, etc." 
41-6-98. Duties respecting crawler type tractor, power shovel, derrick 
or other equipment or structure.-(a) No person shall operate or move any 
crawler type tractor, power shovel, derrick, roller or any equipment or 
structure having normal operating speed of ten or less miles per hour 
or a vertical body or load clearance of less than ½ inch per foot of the 
distance between any two adjacent axles or in any event of less than 
nine inches measured above the level surface of a roadway upon or across 
any tracks at a railroad grade crossing without first complying with this 
section. 
(b) Notice of any such intended crossing shall be given to a station 
agent of such railroad and a reasonable time shall be given to such rail-
road to provide proper protection at such crossing. 
( c) Before making any such crossing the person operating or moving 
any such vehicle or equipment shall first stop the same not less than 
ten feet nor more than fifty feet from the nearest rail of such railway and 
while so stopped shall listen and look in both directions along such track 
for any approaching train and for signals indicating the approach of a 
railroad train, and shall not proceed until the crossing can be made 
safely. 
(d) No such crossing shall be made when warning is given by auto-
matic signal or crossing gates or a flagman or otherwise of the imme-
diate approach of a railroad train. If a flagman is provided by the 
railroad, movement over the crossing shall be made under his direction. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 85; C. 1943, 
57-7-162; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 
86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "of less 
than ½ inch per foot of the distance be-
tween any two adjacent axles" in subsec. 
(a) and added the last sentence in subsec. 
(d). 
The 1961 amendment substituted "craw-
!er type tractor, power shovel" for "cater-
pillar tractor, steam shovel" and "ten or 
less" for "six or less" in su bsec. (a). 
Collateral References. 
Railroads~327 ( 1). 
75 C.J.S. Railroads § 773. 
Liability for personal injuries by trac-
tor, 48 A. L. R. 939. 
41-6-99. Designation of through highways and stop intersections-Stop 
or Yield Right of Way signs-Erection and location-Lettering and illumi-
nation-Duty and place to stop.-(a) The state road commission, with 
reference to state highways, and local authorities, with reference to high-
ways under their jurisdiction, may designate through highways and erect 
stop signs or Yield Right of Way signs at specified entrances thereto or may 
designate any intersection as a stop intersection and erect like signs at one 
or more entrances to such intersections. 
(b) Every said sign shall bear the word "Stop" in letters not less 
than 8 inches in height and such signs shall at nighttime be rendered 
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luminous by steady or flashing internal illumination, or by fixed flood 
light projected on the face of the sign, or by efficient reflecting elements 
on the face of the sign. 
( c) Every stop sign shall be located as near as practicable at the 
nearest line of the crosswalk on the near side of the intersections, or, if 
there is no crosswalk, then as close as practicable to the nearest line of 
the roadway. 
( d) Every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop 
before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, in 
the event there is no crosswalk, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, 
but if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting highway where 
the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting highway 
before entering the intersection, except when directed to proceed by a 
police officer or traffic control signal. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 86; C, 1943, 
57-7-163; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 
86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment revised former 
sub sec. (b) to revise the wording of the 
first sentence (now the text of the sub-
section) and to incorporate the provision 
of the former second sentence as present 
subsec. (c) and designated former subsec. 
( c) as su bsec. ( d) and rephrased the 
subsection to broaden the provisions. 
The 1961 a mendment inserted "or Yield 
Right of Way signs" in subsec. (a) and 
substituted "8 inches" for "6 inches" in 
subsec. (b ). 
1. In general. 
Subsection (c) of this section, prior to 
1949 amendment, was adopted by the 1941 
Utah legislature, repealing 57-7-8 and 57-
7-9 of chapter 7, Title 57, R. S. 1933. But 
this repeal did not expressly or by im-
plication repeal 10-8-30 (then 15-8-30). It 
was held that there was nothing incon-
sistent between the two statutes, nor be-
tween the Ogden City Ordinance and 
chapter 52, Session Laws of 1941, now 
found in Title 41 of Code 1953. Thorpe 
v. Bamberger R. Co., 107 U. 265, 153 P. 
2d 541. 
2. Duty at through streets. 
A motorist who stops at a through street 
before entering has been held to be 
privileged thereafter without restriction, 
and may rely upon right of way given to 
him. Smith v, Lenzi, 74 U. 362, 279 P. 
893, applying former law. 
Collateral References. 
AutomobilesP171(4). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 363. 
Rights and duties at intersection of 
arterial or other favored highway and 
nonfavored highway, 58 A. L. R. 1197, 81 
A. L. R. 185. 
41-6-100. Vehicle emerging from alley, driveway or building-Duty 
to stop and yield right of way.-The driver of a vehicle within a business 
or residence district emerging from an alley, driveway or building shall 
stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or into the 
sidewalk area extending across any alleyway or private driveway, and 
shall yield the right of way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid 
collision, and upon entering the roadway shall yield the right of way to all 
vehicles approaching on said roadway. · 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 87; C. 1943, 
57-7-164; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added "and shall 
yield * * * on said roadway." 
Collateral References. 
AutomobilesP167(1). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 345. 
Duty at private crossing or driveway, 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-100.10 
41-6-100.10. School bus-Signs and light signals-Duty to stop for 
school bus-Operation of signals.-(1) Every school bus, when operated 
for the transportation of school pupils shall bear upon the front and rear 
thereof a plainly visible sign containing the words "school bus" in letters 
not less than four inches in height, which can be removed or covered when 
the vehicle is not in use as a school bus. Every school bus when operated 
for the transportation of school children shall be equipped with alternating 
flashing red light signals visible from the front and rear of a type to be 
approved and mounted as prescribed by the state road commission. Pro-
vided that all buses purchased or repainted after the effective date of this 
act shall display the words "school bus" in letters not less than eight inches 
in height. 
(2) The driver of any vehicle upon a highway, street or road, upon 
meeting or overtaking any school bus equipped with signs as herein re-
quired which has stopped on a highway, street or road for the purpose of 
receiving or discharging any school children and when such school bus 
is displaying alternating flashing red light signals visible from the front 
or rear, shall bring such vehicle to a stop immediately before reaching said 
school bus and shall not proceed until said flashing signals cease operation. 
The driver of a vehicle upon a highway with roadways separated by a 
dividing section need not stop upon meeting or passing a school bus which 
is upon the other roadway. 
(3) The driver of a school bus shall operate these signals at all times 
when children are unloading from a school bus to cross a street, highway, 
or road or when a school bus is stopped for the purpose of loading children 
who must cross a highway, street or road to board said bus; or at any other 
time when it would be hazardous for vehicles to proceed past the stopped 
school bus. Such alternating flashing red signals shall not be operated 
except when the school bus is stopped for loading or unloading school 
children or for any emergency purpose. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-100.10, enacted by 
L. 1959, ch. 66, § 2; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "equip-
ped with alternating flashing * * * road 
commission" for "equipped with flashing 
red light signals visible from the rear and 
flashing amber light signals visible from 
the front of a type to be approved and 
mounted as prescribed by the state road 
commission and the state department of 
education" in subsec. (1); substituted 
"displaying alternating flashing red light 
signals visible from the front or rear" 
for "displaying fla shing amber light sig-
nals visible from the front, and flashing 
red light signals visible from the r ear" 
in subsec. (2) , and substituted "Such 
alternating flashing red signals" for "Such 
flashing a mber signals and flashing red 
signals" in su bsec. ( 3). 
Cross-References. 
Regulations regarding design and oper-
ation of school buses, 41-6-115. 
Standards and specifications for lighting 
and specia l warning devices on school 
buses, 41-6-140.10. 
ARTICLE 14 
STOPPING, STANDING AND PARKING 
Section 41-6-101. Stopping or parking on highway outside of business or residential 
district. 
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41-6-103. 
41-6-104. 
Stopping, standing or parking-Prohibition as to specified places. 
Manner and location-Left-hand or angle parking-Signs prohibiting 
or restricting. 
41-6-101. Stopping or parking on highway outside of business or resi-
dential district.-(a) Upon any highway outside of a business or residence 
district no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether 
attended or unattended, upon th(l paved or main traveled part of the 
highway when it is practical to · stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off 
such part of said highway, but in every event an unobstructed width 
of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free 
passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle shall 
be available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon such 
highway. 
This section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is dis-
abled while on the paved or main traveled portion of a highway in such 
manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and 
temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 88; C. 1943, 
57-7-165. 
1. Construction and application. 
This section deals only with cases where 
the driver stops his car on the highway 
from his own choice, and has an oppor-
tunity to select the place and conditions 
of his stop; it was not intended to regu-
late stopping forced by congested traffic 
on the highway where the driver wishes 
to proceed but cannot because of cars on 
the highway ahead of him. General Ins. 
Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 U. 440, 243 
P. 2d 433. 
2. Negligence. 
The defendant could still be found liable 
for his negligence in parking his truck on 
the highway even though a third party 
(the driver of the car in which plaintiff 
was riding) also was negligent in the 
ma nner in which he drove so that he could 
not avoid the truck. The test is not 
whether the defendant could have fore-
seen the precise form in which the injury 
actually resulted, but he must be held for 
anything which appears to have been a 
natural and probable consequence of his 
act. In applying the test of foreseeability 
to situations where a negligently created 
pre-existing condition combines with a 
later act of negligence causing an injury, 
the courts have drawn a clear-cut distinc-
tion between two classes of cases. The 
first situation is where one has negligently 
created a dangerous condition (such as 
parking a truck on a highway) and a later 
actor observed, or circumstances are such 
that he could not fail to observe, but 
negligently failed to avoid it. The second 
situation involves conduct of a later inter-
vening actor who negligently failed to ob-
serve the dangerous condition until it was 
too la te to avoid it. In the first situation 
it is held as a mat ter of law that the later 
intervening act does interrupt the natural 
sequence of events and cut off the legal 
effect of the n egligence of the initial actor. 
In the second situation, it is held that a 
jury question exists based on the rationale 
that it can reasonably be anticipated that 
circumstances may arise wherein others 
may not observe the dangerous condition 
until too late to escape it. Hillyard v. 
Utah By-Products Co., 1 U. (2d) 143, 263 
P. 2d 287. 
The parking of a vehicle upon the paved 
or traveled portion of a highway is gen-
erally regarded as a hazard to traffic 
thereon, and the court was justified in 
SL1bmitting the question of defendant's 
negligence in parking the truck to the 
jury and the latter were warranted in 
finding that such negligence existed. Hill-
yard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 U. (2d) 
143, 263 P. 2d 287. 
Bus driver was n egligent in failing to 
pull bus completely off the main traveled 
portion of the highway to allow passengers 
to disembark and bµs company was liable 
for injuries to guest in auto tha.t collided 
with protruding rear end of the bus. 
Stapely v. Salt Lake City Lines, 18 U. 
(2d) 1, 414 P. 2d 88. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles<i):::>173 ( 4). 
60A C.J.S. Motor V ehicles § 330. 
Parking or standing, 7 Am. Jnr. 2d 728, 
780 et seq., Automobiles and Highway 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-103 
Constitutionality, construction, and ap-
plication of statute prescribing special 
precautions in passing stopped automobile, 
108 A. L . R. 987. 
Construction and effect in civil actions 
of statute, ordinance, or regulation re-
quiring vehicles to be stopped or parked 
parallel with, or within certain distance 
of curb, 17 A. L. R. 2d 582. 
Liability for injury in collision with 
automobile standing on wrong side of 
street or highway, 70 A. L. R. 1021. 
Liability for injury to pedestrian grow-
ing out of pulling out of parked motor 
vehicle, 29 A. L. R. 2d 136. 
Parking at improper place as affecting 
liability for automobile accident, 73 A. L. 
R. 1074. 
Right to park vehicles on private way, 
37 A. L. R. 2d 944. 
Stopping vehicle on traveled portion of 
highway as affecting responsibility for 
collision between vehicles, 131 A. L . R. 
562. 
Validity of automobile parking ordi-
nances or regulations, 108 A. L. R. 1152, 
130 A. L. R. 316. 
\Vhen is motor v ehicle "disabled" or the 
like within exception to statute regulating 
parking or stopping, 15 A. L. R. 2d 909. 
41-6-102. Police officer authorized to move vehicle.-(a) Whenever 
any police officer finds a vehicle standing upon a highway in violation of 
any of the foregoing provisions of this article such officer is hereby au-
thorized to move such vehicle, or require the driver or other person in 
charge of the vehicle to move the same, to a position off the paved or 
main traveled part of such highway. 
(b) Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle unattended upon any 
bridge or causeway or in any tunnel where such vehicle constitutes an 
obstruction to traffic, such officer is hereby authorized to provide for 
the removal of such vehicle to the nearest garage or other place of safety. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 89; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-166. Automobiles~173(1). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 333. 
41-6-103. Stopping, standing or parking-Prohibition as to specified 
places.-(a) No person shall stop, stand or park a vehicle, except when 
necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with law or 
the directions of a police officer or traffic-control device, in any of the 
following places : 




In front of a public or private driveway. 
Within an intersection. 
Within five feet of a fire hydrant. 
( 5) On a crosswalk. 
(6) Within twenty feet of a crosswalk at an intersection. 
(7) Within thirty feet upon the approach to any flashing beacon, stop 
sign or traffic-control signal located at the side of a roadway. 
(8) Between a safety zone and the adjacent curb or within thirty feet 
of points on the curb immediately opposite the ends of a safety zone, unless 
the traffic authority indicates a different length by signs or markings. 
( 9) Within fifty feet of the nearest rail of a railroad crossing. 
(10) ,Vithin twenty feet of the driveway entrance to any fire station 
and on the side of a street opposite the entrance to any fire station within 
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(11) Alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when 
stopping, standing or parking would obstruct traffic. 
(12) On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the 
edge or curb of a street. 
(13) Upon any bridge or other elevated structure upon a highway or 
within a highway tunnel. 
(14) At any place where official signs prohibit stopping. 
(b) No person shall move a vehicle not lawfully under his control 
into any such prohibited area or away from a curb such distance as is un-
lawful. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 90; c. 1943, 
57-7-167; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "fire" be-
tween "any" and "station" in subd. (a) 
(10) . 
Collateral References. 
Automobilescg::;:,173 ( 4). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 330. 
Validity, construction, and application 
of statute or ordinance for removal of 
automobiles parked in the street contrary 
to regulations, 163 A. L . R. 966. 
41-6-104. Manner and location-Left-hand or angle parking-Signs 
prohibiting or restricting.-(a) Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion every vehicle stopped or parked upon a roadway where there are 
adjacent curbs shall be so stopped or parked with the right-hand wheels 
of such vehicle parallel to and within eighteen inches of the right-hand 
curb. 
(b) Local authorities may by ordinance permit parking of vehicles 
with the left-hand wheels adjacent to and within eighteen inches of the left-
hand curb of a one-way roadway. 
( c) Local authorities may by ordinance permit angle parking on any 
roadway, except that angle parking shall not be permitted on any federal-
aid or state highway unless the state road commission has determined by 
resolution or order entered in its minutes after a public hearing that the 
roadway is of sufficient width to permit angle parking without interfering 
with the free movement of traffic. 
( d) The state road commission with respect to highways under its 
jurisdiction may place signs prohibiting or restricting the stopping, stand-
ing, or parking of vehicles on any highway where in its opinion, as evidenced 
by resolution or order entered in its minutes after a public hearing, such 
stopping, standing, or parking is dangerous to those using the highway or 
where the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere 
with the free movement of traffic thereon. Such signs shall be official 
signs and no person shall stop, stand, or park any vehicle in violation of 
the restrictions stated on such signs. 
History: L . 1941, ch. 52, § 91; C, 1943, 
57-7-168; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment substituted "Ex-
cept as otherwise provided in this section" 
for "Except where angle parking is per-
mitted by local ordinance" in subsec. (a) 
and added subsecs. (b), (c) and (d). 
Cross-Reference. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND RE.GULATIONS 41-6-105 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles.Pl 73 (2). 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 336. 
Liwbility for injury in collision with 
automobile standing on wrong side of 
highway or street, 70 A. L. R. 1021. 
Negligence in 'stopping automobile on 
streetcar track for purp-ose of taking on 
or letting off person, 15 A. L. R. 236. 
P a rking at improper place as affecting 
liability for automobile accident, 73 
A. L. R. 1074. 
Right to park vehicles on private way, 
37 A. L. R. 2cl 944. 
Validity of automobile parking ordi-
nances . or regulations, 130 A. L. R. 316. 
Validity of ordinance which denies to 
automobiles while used for hire the park-
ing privileges extended to automobiles 






Motor vehicle left unattended-Requirements. 
Backing-When permissible. 
Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Place for operator to ride-Pas-
sengers. 
41-6-107.2. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Operation on public highways. 
41,6-107.4. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Attaching to another vehicle 
prohibited. 
41-6-107.6. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Footrests for passenger-Height 
of handle bars limited. 
41-6-107.8. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Protective headgear-Eye-pro-
tective device or windscreen-Closed cab excepted-Approval of 
equipment. · 








Obstruction to driver's view or driving mechanism. 
Driving in canyons and on mountain highways. 
Coasting prohibited. 
Following fire apparatus prohibited. 
Driving over fire hose. 
Destructive or injurious materials o.n highways, parks, recreation 
areas or other public or private lands-Throwing lighted material 
from moving vehicle-Enforcement officers . 
41-6-114.1. Violation-Misdemeanor. 
41-6-114.2. Warning signs. 
41-6-115. School buses-Regulations regarding design and operation. 
41-6-116. Violation of regulations-Penalty. 
41-6-105. Motor vehicle left unattended-Requirements.-No person 
driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended 
without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the 
key, placing the transmission in "park" or the gears in. "low" or "reverse" 
if the vehicle has a manual shift, or effectively setting the brakes thereon; 
and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, turning the front wheels to 
the curb or side of the hig_hway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 62, § 92; C. 1943, 
57-7-169; L. 1969, ch. 112, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "plac-
ing the tmnsmission * * * any perceptible 
grade" for "or when standing upon any 
perceptible grade without effectively set-
ting the brakes thereon and." 
1. Contributory negligence. 
In action for injuries suffered by driver 
,of city garbage truck, when parking brake 
Ort the garbage truck, of which he was in 
charge, suddenly gave way so that he was 
.unable to get back into and control the 
garbage truck, issues of whether the 
driver had left the truck unattended in 
violation of this section and whether his 
conduct proximately contributed to his 
own injuries were issues on which the de-
fendant manufacturer of the garbage truck 
had the burden of proof and it was the 
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sues to a jury if there was any reasonable 
basis for doing so. Thompson v. Ford 
Motor Co., 16 U. (2d) 30, 395 P. 2d 62. 
2. Jury question. 
·where there was a lack of certainty as 
to plaintiff' s attention to truck involved 
in collision and whether plaintiff was close 
enough to control the truck, a jury ques-
tion existed as to whether the truck was 
left "unattended" within the meaning of 
this section. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 
14 U. (2d) 334, 384 P. 2d 109. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles¢:>173 (2) . 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 336. 
Place and manner of parking or stand-
ing, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 783-785, Automobiles 
and Highway Traffic §§ 232-234. 
Liability for damage or injury by 
stranger starting motor vehicle left parked 
on street, 51 A. L. R. 2d 633. 
Liability for injury or damage caused 
by accidental starting up of parked motor 
vehicle, 16 A. L. R. 2d 979. 
41-6-106. Backing-When permissible.-The driver of a vehicle shall 
not back the same unless such movement can be made with reasonable 
safety and without interfering with other traffic. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-169.10, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles@:::)6. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
41-6-107. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle--Place for operator to ride 
-Passengers.-(a) A person operating a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle 
shall ride only upon the permanent and regular seat attached thereto and 
such operator shall not carry any other person nor shall any other person 
ride on a motorcycle or a motor-driven cycle unless such vehicle is designed 
to carry more than one person, in which event a passenger may ride upon 
the permanent and regular seat, if designed for two persons, or upon an-
other seat firmly attached to the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle at the 
rear or side of the operator. 
(b) A person shall ride upon a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle only 
while sitting astride the seat, facing forward, with one leg on either side 
of the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle. 
( c) No person shall operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle while 
carrying any package, bundle, or other article which prevents him from 
keeping both hands on the handle bars. 
( d) No operator shall carry any person, nor shall any person ride, 
in a position that will interfere with the operation or control of the motor-
cycle or motor-driven cycle or the view of the operator. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-169.11, enacted by Cross-Reference. 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L . 1969, ch. 113, § 1. Equipment on motorcycles, 41-6-137. 
Compiler's Notes. Collateral References. 
The 1969 amendment designated the Motorcycle as within statute or ordi-
former section as subsec. (a), inserted nance in relation to motorcars, motor-
"motorcycle or motor-driven cycle at" be- driven cars, etc., 48 A. L. R. 1090, 70 
fore "the rear or side of the operator," A. L. R. 1253. 
and added subsecs. (b) to (d). 
41-6-107.2. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Operation on public 
highways.-(a) All motorcycles and motor-driven cycles are entitled to 
full use of a lane and no motor vehicle shall be driven in such a manner 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-107.8 
lane. This subsection shall not apply to motorcycles or motor-driven cycles 
operated two abreast in a single lane. 
(b) The operator of a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall not over-
take and pass in the same lane occupied by the vehicle being overtaken. 
(c) No person shall operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle between 
lanes of traffic, or between adjacent lines or rows of vehicles. 
(d) Motorcycles or motor-driven cycles shall not be operated more 
than two abreast in a single lane. 
(e) Subsections (b) and (c) shall not apply to police officers in the 
performance of their official duties. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-107.2, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 113, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending section 41-6-107, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, and enacting new 
sections 41-6-107.2, 41-6-107.4, 41-6-107.6, 
41-6-107.8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
relating to motorcycles and motor-driven 
cycles; providing standards for operation 
on public highways; requiring safety 
equipment on public highways; public 
safety commissioner to establish standards 
for equipment. 
Collateral References. 
Reciprocal duties of driver of automo-
bile and bicyclist or motorcyclist, 172 
A. L. R. 736. 
41-6-107.4. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Attaching to another 
vehicle prohibited.-No person riding upon a motorcycle or motor-driven 
cycle shall attach himself to any other vehicle on a roadway. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-107.4, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 113, § 3. 
41-6-107.6. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Footrests for passenger-
Height of handle bars limited.-(a) Any motorcycle or motor-driven ve-
hicle carrying a passenger on a public highway, other than in a sidecar 
or enclosed cab, shall be equipped with footrests for such passenger. 
(b) No person shall operate any motorcycle or motor-driven cycle 
with handle bars above shoulder height. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-107.6, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 113, § 4, 
41-6-107.8. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle-Protective headgear-
Eye-protective device or windscreen-Closed cab excepted-Approval of 
equipment.- (a) No person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or 
motor-driven cycle upon a public highway posted for speeds higher than 
35 miles per hour, unless he is wearing protective headgear which complies 
with standards established by the commissioner of public safety. 
(b) No person shall operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle upon 
a public highway posted for speeds higher than 35 miles per hour, unless 
he is wearing an eye-protective device of a type meeting standards estab-
lished by the commissioner of public safety, except when the motorcycle or 
motor-driven cycle is equipped with a windscreen. 
( c) This section shall not apply to persons riding within a closed 
cab. 
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(d) The comm1ss10ner of public safety is hereby authorized to ap-
prove or disapprove protective headgear and eye-protective devices required 
herein, and to issue, publish and enforce regulations establishing standards 
and specifications for the approval thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-107.8, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 113, § 5. 
Compiler's Notes. 
There are no sections 41-6-107.1, 41-6-
107.3, 41-6-107.5 or 41-6-107.7. 
41-6-108. Prohibition as to passenger riding on improper portion of 
motor vehicle-Exceptions.-N o person shall ride, and no person driving 
a motor vehicle shall knowingly permit any person to ride, upon any portion 
of any vehicle not designed or intended for the use of passengers. This 
provision shall not apply to any vehicle driven elsewhere than upon a high-
way or to an employee engaged in the necessary discharge of his duty or to 
persons riding within or upon any motor vehicle in space intended for any 
load on said vehicle. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-169·.12, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
41-6-109. Obstruction to driver's view or driving mechanism.-(a) No 
person shall drive a vehicle when it is so loaded, or when there are in 
the front seat such number of persons, exceeding three, as to obstruct the 
view of the driver to the front or side of the vehicle or as to interfere 
with the driver's control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle. 
(b) No passenger in a vehicle shall ride in such position as to inter-
fere with the driver's view ahead or to the sides, or to interfere with his 
control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 93; C. 1943, extent of not interfering with the driver's 
57-7-170. vision or his operation and control of 
the vehicle. Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight 
1. Construction and application. Lines, 99 U. 129, 104 P. 2d 225. 
Section is intended to promote safety 
upon the highways, and to charge all 
persons riding in car s with some respon-
sibility for safe driving, at least to the 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~l50. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
41-6-110. Driving in canyons and on mountain highways.-The driver 
of a motor vehicle traveling through defiles or canyons or on mountain high-
ways shall hold such motor vehicle under control and as near the right-
hand edge of the highway as reasonably possible and, upon approaching any 
curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of 200 feet along the 
highway, shall give audible warning with the horn of such motor vehicle. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 94; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-171. Automobiles@:::>146. 
60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 246. 
41-6-111. Coasting prohibited.-(a) The driver of any motor vehicle 
when traveling upon a downgrade shall not coast with the gears of such 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS ·41-6-114 
(b) The driver of a truck or bus when traveling upon a downgrade 
shall not coast with the clutch disengaged.' 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 95; C. 1943, 
57-7-172. 
41-6-112. Following fire apparatus prohibited.-The driver of any ve-
hicle other than one of official business shall not follow any fire apparatus 
traveling in response to a fire alarm closer than 500 feet or drive into 
or park such vehicle within the block where fire apparatus has stopped in 
answer to a fire alarm. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 96; C. 1943, 
57-7-173. 
41-6-113. Driving over fire hose.-N o railroad train or vehicle shall be 
driven over any unprotected hose of a fire department when laid down on 
any street, private driveway, or railroad tra<:k, to be used at any fire 
or alarm of fire, without the consent of the fire department official in 
command. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 97; C. 1943, 
57-7-174. 
41-6-114. Destructive or injurious materials on highways, parks, recrea-
tion areas or other public or private lands-Throwing lighted material 
from moving vehicle- Enforcement officers.-(a) It shall be unlawful for 
any person to throw, deposit, or discard, or to permit to be dropped, 
thrown, deposited, or discarded upon any public road, highway, park, 
recreation area or other public or private land, any glass bottle, glass, 
nails, tacks, wire, cans, barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage, or any 
other substance which would or could mar or impair the scenic aspect or 
beauty of such land in the state of Utah whether under private, state, 
county, municipal, or federal ownership without the permission of the 
owner, or person having control or custody of the land. 
(b) Any person who drops, throws, deposits, or discards, or permits 
to be dropped, thrown, deposited or discarded, upon any public road, high-
way, park, r ecreation area or other public or private land any destructive, 
injurious or unsightly material shall immediately remove the same or cause 
it to be removed. 
(c) Any person r emoving a wrecked or damaged vehicle from a public 
road, highway, park, recreation area or other public or private land shall 
remove any glass or other injurious substance dropped upon the road or 
highway or in the park, recreation area or other public or private land 
from such vehicle. 
(d ) It shall be unlawful to throw any lighted material from a moving 
vehicle. 
( e) Every state fish and game conservation officer, police officer of 
incorporated cities and towns, sheriffs and their deputies, deputy state fire-
wardens and other officers of the state of Utah, within their jurisdiction 
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41-6-114.1 MOTOR VEHICLES 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 98; C. 1943, 
57-7-175; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957, ch. 79, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 90, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment inserted "barbed 
wire, boards, trash or garbage" after 
"cans," and "or which would or could 
injure or impair the health of any person 
or which would or could mar or impair 
the scenic aspect or beauty of such high-
way" after "upon such highway" in subsec. 
(a); and inserted "injurious or unsightly 
material" after "destructive" in subsec. 
(b). 
The 1957 amendment rephrased subsecs. 
(a), (b) and (c) leaving their meaning 
substantially the same, and added subsec. 
(d). 
The 1967 amendment inserted references 
to "other public or private land" in 
subsecs. (a), (b) and (c); in subsec. (a), 
deleted "injure any person, animal, or 
vehicle upon such public road, highway, 
park or recreation area or which would 
or could" before "mar or impair" and sub-
stituted "such land in the state * * • 
custody of the land" for "public road, 
highway, park or recreation area" at 
the end of the subsection; and added 
subsec. ( e) . 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese::>10. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
41-6-114.1. Violation-Misdemeanor.-Any person violating any of the 
provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 79, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending section 41-6-114, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by 
chapter 71, Laws of UtaJ1 1955, relating 
to the throwing of destructive, lighted, 
injurious and unsightly materials on the 
highway and providing that parks, public 
roads and highways be included in the 
affected areas; enacting two new sections 
making the violation of the act a misde-
meanor and directing the state road com-
mission to place warning signs. 
41-6-114.2. Warning signs.-The state road commission shall place ade-
quate warning signs notifying all persons using the public roads, highways, 
parks or recreation areas, of the provisions of this act, wherever they deem 
it proper within the state. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 79, § 3. 
41-6-115. School buses-Regulations regarding design and operation.-
The state road commission and the department, by and with the advice of 
the state board of education, shall adopt and enforce regulations not in-
consistent with this act to govern the design and operation of all school 
buses for the transportation of school children when owned and operated 
by any school district or privately owned and operated under contract 
with any school district in this state and such regulations shall by refer-
ence be made a part of any such contract with a school district. E,very 
school district, its officers and employees, and every person employed under 
contract by a school district shall be subject to said regulations. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 99; C. 1943, 
57-7-176; L. 1957, ch. 78, §5. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1957 amendment inserted "and the 
department," in the first sentence. 
Cross-References. 
School bus, signs and light signals, duty 
to stop, driver, operation of signals, 41-
6-100.10. 
Standards and specifications for lighting 
and special warning devices on school 
buses, 41-6-140.10. 
Collateral References. 
Schools and School Districtse::>159½, 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-116 
41-6-116. Violation of regulations-Penalty.-Any officer or employee 
of any school district who violates any of the regulations provided for in 
the next preceding section or fails to include obligation to comply with said 
regulations in any contract executed by them on behalf of a school district 
shall be guilty of misconduct and subject to removal from office or employ-
ment. Any person operating a school bus under contract with a school dis-
trict who fails to comply with any said regulations shall be guilty of 
breach of contract and such contract shall be canceled after notice and 
hearing by the responsible officers of such school district. 





































Vehicle in unsafe condition or improperly equipped-Violation of 
act-Misdemeanor-Accessories-Exception as to farm imple-
ments and road machinery. 
Lights and illuminating devices-Duty to display-Time. 
Motor vehicle head lamp requirements. 
Tail lamps-Illumination of rear registration plate. 
Reflectors. 
Stop lamps required-Turn signals. 
Clearance lamps or reflectors. 
Lamps, lights and reflectors required on certain vehicles. 
Color of light displayed or reflected. 
Mounting reflectors and clearance lamps. 
Size of reflectors and clearance lamps. 
Vehicles operated in combination. 
Load extending beyond rear of vehicle-Duty to display light or 
flag. 
Parked vehicle-Duty to display lights-Requirements. 
Farm tractors and equipment-Lamps. 
Spot and fog lamps. 
Turn lights-Out-of-state cars. 
Side cowl, fender, running board, and back-up lamps-Warning 
lamps. 
Head lamps and auxiliary lamps-Distribution of light and intensity 
-Beam indicator. 
Dimming of lights. 
Single distribution of lights-Requirements and limitations. 
Motorcycles and motor-driven cycles. 
Requirements for slow moving vehicles. 
Number of front lamps required and permitted. 
Lamps projecting beam greater than 300 candle power- Restric-
tions-Red lights-Flashing, rotating, revolving or oscillating 
white lights. 
Standards and specifications for lighting and special warning 
devices on school buses, 
Snow removal equipment and other work vehicles-Road commis-
sion to adopt standards and specifications for lighting. 
Sale or use of unapproved lighting equipment or devices pro-
hibited. 
Commission authorized to approve lighting devices-Standards and 
specifications. 
Commission may conduct hearings-Notice-Retests. 
Brake equipment-Requirements-Performance. 
Inspection of brakes on motorcycles and motor-driven cycles-Dis-
approval-Effect. 
Horns and warning devices-Emergency vehicles. 
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